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Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness

PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLICNESS
Onnig H. Dombalagian*
Abstract
What duties does a “public” company owe investors, markets, and
society? In recent years, Congress has both strengthened and diluted the
federal disclosure and corporate governance regime that applies to public
companies in the United States. However, it has never articulated a
framework for what it means to be “public,” and how the obligations of
public companies should reflect the needs of the constituencies whose
financial and social interests they affect. As a result, firms fear that
becoming public is an impediment to growth, and they game gradations of
publicness to avoid compliance burdens. This Article proposes reframing
the regulation of public companies under U.S. securities law around three
regulatory principles: (1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3)
representativeness. These principles—and associated tiers of regulation—
will enable stock exchanges, investment banks, and other market
intermediaries to shepherd companies toward heightened degrees of public
exposure and accountability as their capital-raising needs evolve.
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INTRODUCTION
What duties do “public” companies owe investors, markets, and
society? Policy makers and academics have struggled to provide a
satisfactory answer to this question for over eight decades, and Congress
has revisited the issue more than once in recent years.1 The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley)2 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank) strengthened

1. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339–41 (2013) [hereinafter
Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness]; A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited:
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999,
1013–18 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137, 143 (2011).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
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the disclosure and corporate governance obligations of public companies,3
while the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) later
exempted “emerging growth companies” from many of those same
obligations.4 Commentators who favor deregulation question the utility and
indiscriminate application of the disclosure, verification, and governance
requirements that federal securities law imposes on public companies.5
Meanwhile, advocates of greater public accountability lament that
deregulatory mandates threaten not only the transparency and
accountability of corporations to society but also individual investors’
access to public trading opportunities.6
The debate endures in part because federal securities law has never
satisfactorily answered two fundamental questions: (1) what does it mean
for a company to be “public”?; and (2) how should the law calibrate the
obligations of “public” companies to the constituencies whose financial
and social interests they affect? As Professors Donald Langevoort and
Robert Thompson have recounted in a series of recent articles, the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) assume two very different models of publicness in
imposing disclosure standards, governance requirements, compliance
burdens, and other regulatory obligations on companies subject to U.S.
law.7 The disconnect between these Acts reflects their different
3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
4. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 16–19 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, Leave It To Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out of
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 744–69 (2013) (criticizing Congress’s attempt to
federalize certain aspects of corporation law under Dodd–Frank in response to perceived failures of
Delaware law); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (questioning the soundness of the mandatory corporate
governance provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley in light of the empirical finance and accounting
literature).
6. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C.
L. REV. 745, 799–801 (2013) (noting the consolidation of share ownership and arguing that
expanding private securities markets will “crowd out” retail investors); Elizabeth Pollman,
Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 235–41 (2012); Usha Rodrigues,
Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3394 (2013) (arguing that private
markets create “stock exchanges for the rich”).
7. See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013) [hereinafter
Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing] (contrasting the regulatory regimes applicable to public and
private capital-raising transactions under federal securities law); Langevoort & Thompson,
Publicness, supra note 1, at 343–46 (debating the breakpoints at which companies should assume
public disclosure and corporate governance obligations under federal securities law); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5, 102 KY. L.J. 891, 911–
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backstories8 and the fundamental difference in their approaches: the
Securities Act regulates the process of “becoming” public, whereas the
Exchange Act regulates the status of “being” public.
As a practical matter, federal securities regulators and policy makers
have historically deferred to exchanges, investment banks, market makers,
and other market intermediaries to craft heightened degrees of public
exposure and accountability as the capital-raising needs of companies (or
the liquidity needs of their shareholders) evolve.9 As federal securities law
has calcified around metrics for scaling regulatory obligations,10 market
intermediaries have lost the flexibility to consider novel combinations of
privileges and obligations, while policy makers have buried much of the
principle that underlies the spirit of the law. Moreover, as companies
increasingly find themselves in the cross fire of hot-button social issues,
policy makers ratchet up disclosure without revisiting the multiplicity of
roles that securities law plays.11 In response, issuers increasingly perceive
the cost of publicness as an impediment to growth and may game the
boundary between gradations of publicness to delay or avoid compliance
burdens.12
For securities law to regain its footing, the answers to these questions
must be grounded in principle. When the goal of regulation is solely to
level the playing field between issuers and security holders, the law should
mandate governance, disclosure, and compliance mechanisms only to the
extent that investors lack the sophistication and leverage to protect
themselves. If confidence in the fairness and efficiency of securities
markets requires heightened regulation, the law should identify the
constituencies whose confidence is at issue and weigh the costs of
additional obligations against the benefits to those market participants.
12 (2013–14) [hereinafter Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs] (discussing the erosion of the Securities
Act’s restrictions on the marketing of public offerings).
8. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 49–72 (3d ed.
2003) (recounting history of the Securities Act); id. at 73–100 (recounting the history of the
Exchange Act).
9. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 21–41 (1970)
(describing the role and demise of self-regulation in the decades preceding the enactment of the
Securities Act); see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO
Identity Crisis, 1 BROOKLYN J. FIN. CORP. & COM. L. 317, 318–23 (2006) [hereinafter Dombalagian,
Identity Crisis].
10. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39
J. CORP. L. 347, 349–50 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Law and Economics] (discussing the trend to
“gloss over” the justifications for regulatory scaling).
11. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 372–73, 375–79 (describing
contemporary securities regulation as a “joint project of experimentation in investor protection
coupled with a public-driven demand for more transparency, voice, and accountability”).
12. See id. at 347; Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1,
2 (2012).
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Finally, if public companies have business relationships that are deeply
interwoven in the fabric of the economy and polity of the United States, the
U.S. disclosure and corporate governance regime should focus primarily on
the nexus between the privileges and obligations created by those
relationships.
This Article proposes reframing the regulation of public companies
under U.S. federal securities law around three well-worn regulatory
principles: (1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3) representativeness. The
association of particular privileges, obligations, and regulated
intermediaries with these principles is not talismanic; indeed, much of the
law that governs public companies relies on these principles, implicitly or
explicitly. Consequently, such principles can serve as a focal point for
negotiating transitions from private to public based on the capital-raising
needs of issuers and the needs of their investors, capital markets, and
society. More specifically, recasting many of the privileges and obligations
of federal securities law around “core principles” administered by selfregulatory bodies and regulated entities permits greater flexibility in their
application over time.13
Part I of this Article briefly recites the connotations of being or
becoming “public,” focusing on the burdens and benefits associated with
being public or private in U.S. capital markets. Part II considers the
transitions that companies face as they evolve from private to public—
changes in control, transparency, and responsibility for the externalities of
their business and capital-raising activities. Part III contrasts the traditional
issuer-driven approach to determining how public an issuer would like to
be with the increasing use of metrics to determine how public an issuer
ought to be. Finally, Part IV explores an approach by which the trade-offs
associated with various tiers of publicness may coalesce around the
principles of suitability, efficiency, and representativeness.
I. GRADATIONS OF PUBLICNESS
When policy makers speak of the obligations of public companies, they
evoke the fabled “sweet spot” in the securities marketplace. In the United
States, one might think of a corporation that: (1) is listed on a national
exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the NASDAQ
Stock Market (NASDAQ); (2) has shares that are actively and efficiently
13. In the context of trading rules and business conduct regulation, policy makers have
advocated the articulation of “core principles” by legislation, while leaving it to self-regulatory
bodies, such as securities and futures exchanges and dealer associations, to interpret and implement
them. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 109–13 (Mar. 2008), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps110157/
Blueprint.pdf; see also 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1) (2012) (setting forth “core principles” for the regulation
of designated contract markets for futures trading).
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traded by market makers and institutional investors informed by regulatory
disclosures and outside information gathered by securities analysts; (3) is
governed by a board elected by, and accountable to, public shareholders;
and (4) offers products and services that command a national or
international reach.14 Of course, most companies do not spring fully
formed from the forehead of Mammon: companies accumulate such
privileges and assume heightened responsibilities by virtue of their capitalraising and business decisions15 as well as the willingness of market
participants and intermediaries to finance their progress toward various
“financial milestones.”16
Nevertheless, whether one views publicness as a progressive series of
stages in the “lifecycle” of a company17 or simply as a series of unrelated
attributes lumped under a common rubric, commentators often view
publicness as an end that the law should promote in the public interest.18
For example, policy makers often assert that public firms may have a better
track record of creating jobs;19 make investment opportunities available to
a broader class of investors;20 or simply provide investors, academics, and
other interested parties with greater insight into how the economy operates.

14. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 564
(2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, Twlight of Equity]; see also Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness,
supra note 1, at 374 (“[The] amorphous cluster of public law within securities regulation is meant
for those companies with a large public footprint.”).
15. See infra Section III.A (discussing the decisions to mount an initial public offering (IPO),
to list securities on an exchange, and to make securities available for trading through a central
depository).
16. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information
Order of Sarbanes–Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2003); see Bernard S. Black & Ronald J.
Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J.
FIN. ECON. 243, 264 (1998) [hereinafter Black & Gilson, Banks Versus Stock Markets].
17. See Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 579 (recommending a “lifecycle
model” of secondary market regulation that narrowly tailors regulatory obligations to the needs of
investors as firms progress through various stages of maturity).
18. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 340 (defining “publicness” as
“what society demands of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate”).
19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 7 (2012) (asserting, as part of the justifications for the
JOBS Act, that “[r]esearch indicates that 90% of the jobs that companies create are created after
their IPO”).
20. See Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 3425, 3427–30 (surveying perspectives on the importance
of investment access to unaccredited investors as a matter of providing opportunities for portfolio
diversification); see also MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 28–49 (1994) (advancing the political theory that diffuse, public
ownership of U.S. corporations was the product of “[p]opular animus against large financial
institutions,” which led to restrictions or limitations on concentrated ownership of U.S. corporations
by banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial institutions); Gubler, supra note
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To this end, one might envision gradations of publicness delimited by
market norms and investor expectations. This Article proposes four such
gradations. First, one might classify a company as publicly held if its shares
are freely alienable. Second, a company may be classified as publicly
traded if its shares come to be actively bought and sold in a liquid
secondary market. Third, a company may be classified as publicly
monitored once an issuer adopts an internal reporting and governance
architecture and engages independent external compliance oversight.
Finally, a company may be classified as publicly accountable if its
operations merit heightened public scrutiny by virtue of the economic and
social impact of its business activities.
A. Publicly Held
The most basic gradation of publicness might encompass companies
that have offered for sale to the general public debt or equity interests that
are freely alienable without further negotiation of exit rights.21 The
canonical example is a company that has made a “registered public
offering” under section 5 of the Securities Act.22 A company may pursue a
public offering for a variety of reasons, such as to access new and diverse
sources of financing for growth, promote name recognition, provide an
objective value for shares (and other components of managerial
compensation), or provide founders and other early investors with an
opportunity to exit their interest.23 The expense of preparing a registration
statement and prospectus that complies with the requirements of the
Securities Act24 and the underwriting fees charged in initial public
offerings (IPOs) are, nevertheless, considerable barriers to such offerings.25
6, at 799–801 (discussing, in addition to the benefits of portfolio diversification, the specter of
wealth inequality, sharpening of class differences, and undesirable “political correctives”).
21. As a matter of state law, such companies would be distinct from those that place
conditions or restrictions on the transfer of securities (such as through an agreement with or among
security holders) or those whose organizational form does not permit alienation of ownership
interests (such as many partnerships or member-managed LLCs).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
23. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 93–94 (2006).
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77j, 77aa.
25. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 92–93 (noting that going public “is costly” in part because
firms must incur “substantial underwriting and legal fees”); Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The
Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1116 (2000) (discussing, among other explanations for the
high cost of IPO underwriting clustered at a spread of around 7%, the inelastic demand for
underwriter prestige, the cost of analyst coverage and price stabilization, and syndication); Richard
A. Booth, The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between Corporations
and Partnerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 92 (1997) (noting the expense of creating
registration statements and other documents incident to going public). As will be discussed in
Section I.B, a public offering under the Securities Act also triggers the compliance costs, periodic
disclosure requirements, and heightened liability associated with the public trading of securities.
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For this reason, federal securities law has provided issuers with an everexpanding menu of options for offering freely tradable securities to the
public without the cost of mounting an IPO. The Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Regulation A, for example, permits a tier of direct
public offerings of up to $5 million subject to a less onerous offering
statement and circular.26 In light of Regulation A’s limited utility, the
JOBS Act mandated a second tier of Regulation A offerings of up to $50
million subject to enhanced disclosure obligations.27 The SEC also permits
offerings of up to $1 million under various exemptions, such as the
exemption in Rule 504 geared toward offerings registered or exempt under
state law28 and the exemption for crowdfunded offerings mandated by the
JOBS Act.29
As commentators have observed, however, a new trend is to use private
placements or other “back door” transactions to place securities indirectly
with the public to avoid the heightened disclosure requirements for direct
offerings.30 Generally speaking, issuers may privately place securities (for
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)(1).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–.263 (2014). For a description of Regulation A, see Proposed Rule
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act,
79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3927 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New
Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation: The Impact―If Any―Of the JOBS Act, 102 KY.
L.J. 815, 839–40 (2013–2014) (providing that under Regulation A, the issuer may make a public
offering of up to $5 million, predicated on the filing of an offering statement and an offering
circular); see also id. at 844 (noting Regulation A’s tiered offerings).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (requiring the SEC by rule or regulation to add a class of securities
exempted under section 3(b) that may be offered in an aggregate amount not to exceed $50 million
during a twelve-month period); see also Campbell, supra note 26, at 840–41 (noting that, in the
wake of the “failure” of Regulation A, the JOBS Act added section 3(b) providing an exemption for
offerings of up to $50 million); Proposed Rule Amendments, 79 Fed. Reg. at 3927.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504; see also Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2012) (comparing Rule 504
and the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exemption).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (requiring the SEC by rule or regulation to implement a
crowdfunding exemption); Rules Governing the Offer and Sale of Securities Through
Crowdfunding Under Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9470,
78 Fed. Reg. 66427 (Nov. 5, 2013); see also Cohn, supra note 28, at 1438 (“The exemption allows
for up to one million dollars to be raised during a twelve-month period, reduced by the amount of
any other securities sold by the issuer during that period.”). The offering of shares through such
arrangements poses idiosyncratic regulatory issues, particularly to the extent that investors may
participate in crowdfunded offerings for a variety of reasons other than an expectation of profit. See
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1,
14–27 (classifying motivations for investing in crowdfunded enterprises); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
335, 358–61 (2012) (describing the “market for crowdfunding and crowdfunded interests in
business ventures” before the JOBS Act).
30. See generally Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1588–1604
(describing “back door” transactions such as private investments in public equity (PIPEs) and

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/22

8

Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness

2015]

PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLICNESS

657

example, in reliance on Rule 506 under Regulation D)31 with certain
categories of “accredited investors”32 as well as additional offerees who
possess the sophistication and access to information necessary to be “able
to fend for themselves.”33 Rule 506 placements have long enjoyed greater
popularity than other exemptions (including exemptions for direct
offerings) due to the opportunity for unlimited sales, no minimum
disclosure requirements for accredited investors, and preemption of state
law registration and qualification.34 Nevertheless, the SEC has faced
reverse mergers). Reverse mergers with an Exchange Act reporting company allow affiliates of an
issuer to resell their securities immediately to the public under the cloak of the reporting company’s
public status, id. at 1588–98, while PIPEs may allow investors in a private placement by a public
company to resell their securities without triggering “underwriter” liability. Id. at 1598–1604.
31. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.25 (6th ed.
2009); see also Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 190 (2008).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining “accredited investor” by reference to regulatory status,
net worth, or net income). The development of criteria for “accredited investors” is critical to the
success of these efforts. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED, GAO 13-640, 8–12 (July 2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
655963.pdf [hereinafter 2013 AI Report] (relating the history of the definition of accredited
investor). Congress and the SEC have allowed issuers to place unlimited quantities of securities
with an unlimited number of accredited purchasers without any minimum disclosure requirement on
the theory that accredited investors have the sophistication and leverage to negotiate for information
or the capacity to absorb risk. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding “accredited
investors” for purposes of calculating the number of investors in Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings);
id. § 230.502(b)(1) note (establishing disclosure requirements for sales of securities to persons other
than accredited investors subject to the caveat that the issuer “should consider providing such
information to accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws”).
33. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The SEC has implemented this
principle through various safe harbors and exemptions. Among other factors, such relief may limit
the number and qualifications of individuals to whom an issuer may offer or sell a security, the use
of mass media and other forms of “general solicitation,” and the ability of successive purchasers to
resell such securities until the issuer’s securities have “come to rest.” See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501,
.502(c), .505, .506; see also Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1987).
34. Campbell, supra note 26, at 826–27 (discussing the reasons why Rule 506 is “very
popular”). For a discussion of state law preemption, see infra text accompanying note 187.
According to a recent series of studies by SEC staff, the amount of capital raised under Regulation
D rivals that of both IPOs and Rule 144A offerings. VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS,
CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D
EXEMPTION, 2009–2012, at 8–9 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/
whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf. Moreover, 99% of capital raised under
Regulation D was raised under Rule 506, even though (1) 50% of Rule 506 offerings were for $1
million or less and (2) an additional 20% of such offerings were for $5 million or less, therefore
qualifying for less restrictive offering rules under Rules 504 and 505. Id. at 7, 11; see also Proposed
Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities
Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3967–71 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014) (proposing preemption of state
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significant pressure to liberalize resales of such “restricted securities” to
reduce the economic risk of participating in private placements. Today,
initial investors may resell such securities after a relatively short holding
period with few restrictions on the manner of offering or the extent of
public diffusion.35
More recent deregulatory efforts may facilitate public diffusion of such
privately placed securities more rapidly than Congress or the SEC ever
intended. As required by the JOBS Act,36 the SEC eliminated the
prohibition against the use of the Internet and other mass media to solicit
accredited investors in Rule 506 private placements.37 Although Rule 506
requires issuers to take “reasonable steps” to verify the status of
purchasers,38 the shift from regulating offerings to verifying purchasers
allows issuers to raise the public profile of their private capital-raising
securities law registration and qualification requirements for “Tier 2” Regulation A offerings of up
to $50 million); Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad)
Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 940 (2011) (criticizing the
SEC’s failure to liberalize Rules 504 and 505).
35. The resale of privately placed securities by affiliates or nonaffiliates of the issuer to the
public may constitute a “distribution” that exposes both the issuer and selling security holders as
“underwriters” to liability for noncompliance with the registration requirement of the Securities Act.
See 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 566–76 (6th ed. 2011)
(describing interpretation of section 4(a)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012)). The SEC
adopted Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, as a safe harbor for resales of such “restricted” securities
based on factors that courts had developed to distinguish issuer “distributions” from routine
“trading” transactions, including the investor’s holding period, the information available about the
issuer, the amount of securities resold, the character of the selling effort, and the availability of
public information about the issuer. See id. § 230.144(c)–(g); Definition of Terms “Underwriter”
and “Brokers’ Transactions,” 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 592 (Jan. 14, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144); 1 LOSS ET AL., supra, at 566–81 (describing private resales under section 4(1) of the
Securities Act prior to Rule 144). Over the past two decades, the SEC has progressively reduced the
holding period for restricted securities and has substantially eliminated restrictions on the amount
and manner of resale for persons other than affiliates of the issuer. See Revisions to Rules 144 and
145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,546 (Dec. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239);
Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9242 (Feb. 28,
1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
36. See Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
37. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,796 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c). The ability to rely on a third-party certification from a broker–
dealer (among other professionals) presents an opportunity for the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) to play a greater oversight role in private placements—similar to broker–dealers
using their “preexisting relationships” with customers to place securities in compliance with the
prohibition against “general solicitation.” See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: Will FINRA
Sink in the Sea Change?, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 479–88 (2013); see also infra Subsection II.A.2.ii
(discussing FINRA’s “suitability rule”).
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transactions.39 In light of the limited holding period for resales of privately
placed securities under the SEC’s Rule 144 safe harbor, one may
effectively prime the secondary retail market simultaneously with a highprofile private placement—a potential Facebook, for instance—thereby
creating a “[d]eregulatory securities nirvana.”40
B. Publicly Traded
The mere fact that securities may be freely alienated does not guarantee
a secondary market populated with prospective buyers and sellers. Such a
vibrant secondary market may be of critical importance to an issuer that
wishes to raise money (or compensate its executives and employees)
through the issuance of additional shares in subsequent transactions. The
second gradation of publicness might therefore include issuers of securities
traded in a secondary market that provides investors with a reasonable
expectation of liquidity.41 The degree of liquidity a firm enjoys depends not
only on quantitative factors, such as the size and diffusion of the issuer’s
capital stock, but also on the participation of intermediaries, such as
broker–dealers and market makers, to facilitate investment in and trading
of its shares.42
Issuers who seek to foster a secondary market for their securities must
generally provide sufficient ongoing information to allow prospective
buyers, sellers, and market intermediaries to negotiate prices reasonably
39. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
40. Panel Discussion, Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 476, 491
(2013) (statement of Professor Robert Thompson). Business considerations may prevent a fullblown indirect public resale market. Issuers may refuse to eliminate contractual restrictions or stoptransfer instructions to prevent the resale of securities otherwise eligible for immediate sale to avoid
dealing with new configurations of shareholders. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 44. Venture
Capitalists (VCs) may wish contractually to lock founders in as well. See Jose M. Mendoza & Erik
P.M. Vermeulen, The “New” Venture Capital Cycle (Part I): The Importance of Private Secondary
Market Liquidity 24 (Lex Research Topics in Corp. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 1, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829835 (explaining that founders
may lose motivation to contribute to the corporation when they can start selling their shares, so
firms may want to use restrictions in their “by-laws, investment term sheets or employment
contracts” to prevent founders from selling their shares).
41. State corporation laws may treat securities as increasingly passive investments as the
number of holders increases. For example, many states limit appraisal rights when there is an
adequate opportunity to sell shares into the market. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)
(West 2013) (creating a market-out exception from the appraisal statute for firms whose shares are
held of record by more than 2,000 holders); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(1)(ii)
(2002) (same). The Model Business Corporation Act further defines the oversight responsibilities of
directors of public companies in light of the separation of ownership from management. Id. § 8.01
& cmt. (setting forth and discussing the “oversight responsibilities” of directors of public
companies).
42. See generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 394–409 (2003) (defining
“liquidity and its various dimensions,” and identifying the “types of traders who supply liquidity”
and discussing “how they compete with each other”).
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related to a market equilibrium. The gold standard is the reporting regime
established under section 13 of the Exchange Act.43 The Exchange Act
imposes reporting requirements on companies that have a class of
securities listed on a national securities exchange,44 meet the Act’s
shareholder numerosity and asset thresholds,45 or undertake to become
reporting companies when making a public offering.46 As will be discussed
in Section I.C, Exchange Act reporting subjects public companies to many
additional monitoring obligations as well.
Issuers may also commit to disclosures comparable to the Exchange Act
even when they are not otherwise subject to the Act’s reporting regime.47
Holders of publicly traded debt might require an issuer to commit to
periodic reporting beyond the Exchange Act’s requirements,48 and
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) might require comparable compliance
to sustain secondary trading under the QIB Rule.49 As trading in
institutional and public debt markets has become increasingly
transparent,50 exchanges and investment banks have renewed efforts to
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012). The Exchange Act requires reporting companies to make
annual, quarterly, and episodic filings with the SEC regarding their financial condition, business
and operations, and management and corporate governance. 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 35, at 670–88
(summarizing the reporting requirements).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b).
45. Id. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (raising the numerosity threshold for equity shareholders from 500
shareholders to either 2000 persons or 500 persons who are not accredited investors); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (2014) (raising asset threshold from $1 million to $10 million); see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g5-1 (providing rules for counting legal entities, such as corporations, for numerosity
purposes); see also infra note 56 (critiquing counting of shareholders under section 12(g)). The
JOBS Act requires the SEC to exempt crowdfunded offerings from section 12(g). 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(g)(6).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
47. See infra note 129–130.
48. An issuer’s obligation to publish Exchange Act reports with respect to a publicly offered
class of securities, such as a class of unlisted debt securities, is “automatically suspended as to any
fiscal year” after the first fiscal year in which the securities of the class are “held of record by less
than 300 persons.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
49. Rule 144A permits unlimited resales of certain privately placed securities among QIBs
subject to minimum disclosure requirements with a view to facilitating immediate trading of
corporate debt and other securities in segregated institutional markets. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(Rule 144A or the QIB Rule).
50. FINRA requires real-time reporting of corporate debt transactions. FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH. MANUAL R. 6200 et seq. (2014), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4412 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) [hereinafter
FINRA MANUAL]; see, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Dissemination of
Transactions in TRACE-Eligible Securities that are Effected Pursuant to Securities Act Rule 144A,
Exchange Act Release No. 70,009, 106 SEC Docket 15 (July 19, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2013/34-70009.pdf (setting forth FINRA’s proposal for greater
post-trade transparency in Rule 144A transactions).
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establish trading platforms that provide liquidity among QIBs;51 ongoing
reporting is a necessary complement to such efforts. Moreover, while
offerings of equity securities under Rule 144A remain rare,52 public or
privately placed debt securities that are convertible or exchangeable into
publicly tradable equity securities may create additional incentive for
issuers to develop or maintain Exchange Act disclosure controls.53
Not all trading in secondary markets relies on the availability of
Exchange Act reports.54 Securities sold in smaller public or private equity
offerings but that do not enjoy deep trading interest may rely
predominantly on individual market makers in “over-the-counter”
markets.55 Individual dealers acting as over-the-counter market makers
may hold themselves out as willing to buy and sell securities of an issuer
with or without the issuer’s consent.56 Market makers and broker–dealers
51. 1 EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 5.05 (11th ed. 2014) (describing unsuccessful attempts to develop
organized markets or trading systems for Rule 144A securities); see Peter Lattman, Private
Goldman Exchange Officially Closes for Business, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:09 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/private-goldman-exchange-officially-closes-for-business/
(describing the demise of the Goldman Sachs Tradable Unregistered Equity (GSTrUE) platform due
to a lack of liquidity); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3A SEC. & FED. CORP.
LAW § 4:12 (2d ed.) (describing PORTAL Alliance as “an open, industry-wide platform to facilitate
over the counter trading of 144A equity securities” co-sponsored by NASDAQ OMX Group and
various investment and commercial banks).
52. See CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 7.09[A][2] (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2013).
53. 1 GREENE ET AL., supra note 51, § 7.08[3] (describing Rule 144A convertible and
exchangeable securities); JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 52, § 7.09[A] (same); see also infra
note 129.
54. Because the Exchange Act reporting obligation terminates once the number of holders of
record of a class of unlisted securities is reduced to less than 300 persons, issuers may take steps—
some questionable—to exit Exchange Act reporting. See Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 135, 140–43 (2009) (describing how firms might use reverse stock splits or self-tender
offers to withdraw from Exchange Act reporting requirements); Langevoort & Thompson,
Publicness, supra note 1, at 357 (suggesting that issuers might use the divergence of record and
beneficial ownership to withdraw from Exchange Act reporting requirements under section 12(g)).
But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(b)(3) (“If the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of
holding securities of record is used primarily to circumvent the provisions of section 12(g) or 15(d)
of the Act, the beneficial owners of such securities shall be deemed to be the record owners
thereof.”).
55. These may include securities listed and traded on platforms such as the Over-the-Counter
Bulletin Board (OTC BB) and OTC Markets. See infra note 222.
56. Exchange Act 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2014), generally exempts foreign
private issuers that are not listed in the United States from Exchange Act reporting, although
involuntary trading of their shares can nevertheless subject them to increased compliance costs in
the United States. See Peter Iliev et al., Uninvited U.S. Investors? Economic Consequences of
Involuntary Cross-Listings, 52 J. ACCT. RES. 473, 480–85 (2014) (noting that “[u]nsponsored OTC
cross-listings can impose several costs on foreign firms, including increased exposure to U.S. legal
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quoting prices for such securities must nevertheless ensure the availability
of a minimum quantum of information about the issuer,57 though the risk
of price inefficiency, manipulation, and insider trading increases as trading
interest and the degree of issuer disclosure decreases.58
In recent years, prospective purchasers of securities in traditional
private placements have likewise looked to electronic trading venues for
liquidity. Trading venues such as SecondMarket and SharesPost typically
operate as traditional agency markets.59 These venues provide only limited
information to prospective purchasers60 and often give issuers significant
control over who can buy and sell shares, the volume of transactions, and
price-setting mechanisms.61 As a result, the participants in these electronic
trading venues generally have independent access to (or leverage to obtain)
information from the issuer without the need for mandatory disclosure.62 In
and regulatory enforcements, risk of future exchange act registration, adverse treatment of U.S.
security holders, and increased difficulty in establishing a future sponsored ADR program”).
57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11. Compare FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 6530
(requiring OTC BB issuers to comply with Exchange Act reporting requirements) with id. R. 6432
(requiring members to comply with SEC Rule 15c2-11 to quote nonexchange-listed securities in
any quotation medium). Rules 144 and 144A similarly impose minimum information requirements
for resales of “restricted” securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (requiring public availability of
information regarding the issuer by reference to Rule 15c2-11); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d). The SEC
has also proposed semiannual and current reporting requirements for “Tier 2” Regulation A
companies. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3959–61 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014).
58. Pollman, supra note 6, at 205–20. As will be discussed in more detail below, U.S.
companies may occasionally seek to list on foreign securities markets, such as alternative tiers
catering to small to medium-sized companies, to take advantage of laxer disclosure requirements.
See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 639, 659 (2009) [hereinafter Sjostrom, Carving a New Path].
59. Much of the interest in and publicity surrounding SharesPost and SecondMarket was
attributable to pre-public trading interest in Facebook. See Sam Mamudi, Nasdaq CEO Sees SEC
Approval for Private Market, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201402-05/nasdaq-ceo-sees-winning-sec-approval-for-private-market.html. Nevertheless, NASDAQ has
continued with plans to launch the NASDAQ Private Market to enter this marketplace. See
NASDAQ OMX and SharesPost to Form Private Market, NASDAQ (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=745594.
60. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 6, at 209–10 (discussing the potentially limited value of
reports coming from SharesPost). Some electronic trading venues may seek to aggregate publicly
available information for the benefit of their participants as a means of quelling concerns about the
lack of sufficient information or the accuracy of their valuation. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra
note 40, 19–20 (describing SharesPost’s Venture-Backed Index and the additional informational
services provided with respect to its component securities).
61. Memorandum from Annemarie Tierney, General Counsel, SecondMarket 2, 5 (Sept. 12,
2011), available at https://www.secondmarket.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Memo-onSecondMarkets-Legal-Framework-SecondMarket.pdf.
62. Sellers in such markets have consisted largely of founders, employees, and early
investors. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 16–18; Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 17
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raising the Exchange Act’s reporting threshold with respect to accredited
investors and eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation for
certain Regulation D offerings, the JOBS Act has signaled a willingness to
promote secondary trading in these systems.63
C. Publicly Monitored
A third gradation of publicness might encompass those firms whose
demand for liquidity requires greater accountability to a larger financial
community, including analysts, market makers, investment and
commercial banks, and brokers.64 Internal and external monitors provide
assurances as to the accuracy of historical information and the good faith
basis for forward-looking information: analysts, market makers, and
professional traders transform such information into prices, price targets,
or trading interest, while banks and broker–dealers rely on such prices for
purposes of extending credit against securities collateral and managing
their trading inventory and financial exposure.65 In response to Enron-era
(describing the composition of sellers in SecondMarket). Buyers have included venture capital
firms, private equity funds, and other institutional and accredited investors. See Ibrahim, supra note
12, at 19–20; Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 18 (describing the composition of buyers in
SecondMarket). These buyers might also simultaneously purchase securities in such markets
alongside direct purchases from an issuer or otherwise negotiate for direct access to information
from an issuer. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 19–20.
63. See JOBS Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Legislative
Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises, 112th Cong. 35–36 (2011)
(statement of Barry E. Silbert, Founder and CEO, SecondMarket), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-63.pdf (highlighting the 500-shareholder
reporting threshold and the prohibition against general solicitation as “regulatory hurdles” that
restricted the ability of start-ups to remain private).
64. This notion of public monitoring to a certain extent relates to the need for accurate pricing
of securities, particularly in response to new information such as earnings estimates, business
projections, and contingencies. Studies of the “mechanisms of market efficiency” focus on the
variety of mechanisms and degree of costs incurred in acquiring, processing, and validating
information. Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 594–609 (1984) (observing that the cost of acquiring, processing, and validating
information turns on factors such as the initial distribution of information, the size and organization
of the marketplace, and the incentives of the analysts, market makers, exchanges, and other
intermediaries that sustain it).
65. See, e.g., Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 BUS. LAW. 863, 867 (1992)
(describing how the real-time calculation of broker–dealer net capital under the SEC’s Net Capital
Rule relies on the market prices of its securities and commodities positions); NYSE RULE 431
(margin rule for NYSE members); see infra note 184 (discussing the Federal Reserve Board’s
margin rules for broker–dealers and banks). Institutions that extend securities credit are arguably
among the most sensitive to disruptions in price continuity to the extent that the value of their
collateral is pegged to market prices. See, e.g., Securities Credit Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,399,
20,402 (proposed May 6, 1996) (seeking comment as to whether the SEC’s “ready market” criteria
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accounting scandals, Sarbanes–Oxley requires all Exchange Act reporting
companies to establish and maintain internal controls over financial
reporting and disclosure and to obtain an attestation on management’s
internal control assessment from its external auditor.66
Higher levels of public monitoring may also follow from the voluntary
decision to list on a stock exchange (and the attendant market making and
analyst exposure that follows). To be eligible for listing on an exchange,
issuers must typically meet certain quantitative thresholds that build on
Exchange Act metrics.67 Moreover, stock exchanges may apply additional
disclosure obligations through their listing standards to ensure real-time
price discovery and price continuity68 as well as corporate governance
criteria aimed at “maintaining appropriate standards of corporate
responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders.”69
Federal securities law has long viewed an issuer’s voluntary decision to
seek an exchange listing as sufficient justification to impose additional
disclosure and governance rules.70 Building upon existing exchange

are sufficient to warrant permitting extensions of credit against over-the-counter equity securities by
broker–dealers).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012).
67. These include total market capitalization, number of shareholders, before-tax earnings
from operations, cash flows, and revenues. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL
§ 102.01 (2012) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL]; NASDAQ STOCK MKT. R. 5315(e), (f) (NASDAQ
Global Select Market), 5405(a), (b) (NASDAQ Global Market), and 5505(a), (b) (NASDAQ
Capital Market).
68. See, e.g., NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 201.00 (emphasizing the need for continuous
and timely disclosure of information “that may affect security values or influence investment
decisions” or that is necessary to enable the exchange “to efficiently perform its function of
maintaining an orderly market for the company’s securities”). In addition to timely disclosure of
material news, such standards might include greater sensitivity with respect to the handling of
confidential corporate matters; fair disclosure of information to analysts and institutional investors;
prompt confirmation, denial, or clarification of rumors; or other steps to address unusual market
activity and procedures for the public release of information through trading halts or otherwise. See,
e.g., id. § 202.01–.06. The SEC’s Regulation FD and related interpretations provide further
guidance to public companies on their public obligations. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2014);
Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act Release No. 58288, 73
Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,867–68 (Aug. 7, 2008); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No.
69,279 (April 2, 2013).
69. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 301.00.
70. National securities exchanges developed many of the innovations of corporate governance
relating to board composition and audit requirements in the United States for their top-tiered
companies at the urging of the SEC. See Audit Committee Disclosure, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,648,
55,649–51 (Oct. 14, 1999) (summarizing the history of interplay of SEC and SRO rules in
promoting the independence and accountability of audit committees); SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at
547–51; infra note 179.
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standards,71 Sarbanes–Oxley requires listed companies to establish an audit
committee composed entirely of independent directors with responsibility
for the “appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any
registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer.”72 Dodd–Frank
similarly requires listed companies to establish compensation committees
with similar qualifications and powers.73 State corporation law has not
been immune to these trends, particularly in the context of monitoring
high-profile transactions and business combinations.74
Federal securities litigation serves as another external monitoring tool
for publicly traded issuers in an efficient market. Despite criticism from
commentators and second-guessing by courts, the “fraud on the market”
theory articulated in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson75 remains the touchstone for
securities class action litigation.76 Accordingly, courts use relative price
efficiency and the existence of mechanisms for acquiring, verifying, and
digesting new information as the evidentiary filter for determining whether
a court will presume reliance on the integrity of market prices.77 Several
71. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing in greater detail the creeping federalization of
exchange rules).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2014). To maintain their
independence, the members of such committees must meet certain criteria of financial independence
and the committees must enjoy plenary authority and adequate corporate resources to carry out their
responsibilities. For example, members of the committee must be directors who are not affiliated
with the issuer and do not “accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the
issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A)–(B); see also NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 303A.01
(requiring listed companies to “have a majority of independent directors” as defined in NYSE
Rules).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(3) (2014) (setting forth qualifications
for “outside directors” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code’s deduction for incentive-based
compensation determined by a compensation committee composed of such directors); NYSE
MANUAL, supra note 67, §§ 303A.04, 303A.05 (requiring that nominating, corporate governance,
and compensation committees consist entirely of independent directors).
74. State corporation law has increasingly recognized the desirability of delegating certain
board functions to independent directors and committees as monitors of regulatory compliance or as
bargaining agents for shareholders in transactions in which management’s interest may diverge from
that of public shareholders, such as takeover bids. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1581 (2007). Professor Jeffrey Gordon suggests that the “overriding effect” of
this trend “is to commit the firm to a shareholder wealth-maximizing strategy as best measured by
stock price performance” because independent directors “are less committed to management and its
vision;” they tend to “look to outside performance signals and are less captured by the internal
perspective, which, as stock prices become more informative, becomes less valuable.” Id. at 1563.
75. 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
76. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408–13 (2014)
(declining to reconsider the “fraud on the market” presumption).
77. Many courts apply the factors of market efficiency described in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.
Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989), appeal dismissed, 993 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1993), to determine
whether to certify a securities class action. These factors include:
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SEC initiatives, such as integrated disclosure and shelf registration, have
invoked efficiency as justification for conferring regulatory privileges as
well.78
D. Publicly Accountable
A final gradation of publicness might encompass “large, economically
powerful business institutions” whose business activities compel the
highest degree of public accountability.79 Large, multinational firms may
maintain such extensive relationships with suppliers, vendors, employees,
customers, creditors, financial counterparties, and other constituencies that
their corporate decision-making reverberates throughout the national and
international economy. By and large, most economic and social regulation
of such companies takes place through bodies of law such as antitrust,
bankruptcy, tax, labor, and civil rights laws. Proponents of corporate social
responsibility nevertheless view the mandatory disclosure mechanisms of
federal securities law as a tool for communicating information to the
investing community and the broader public when voluntary disclosures
fail.80
(1) the stock’s average trading volume; (2) the number of securities analysts that
followed and reported on the stock; (3) the presence of market makers and
arbitrageurs; (4) the company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration
Statement; and (5) a cause-and-effect relationship, over time, between unexpected
corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in stock price.
In re Xcelera.com Secs. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted) (citing
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87). Evidence of market inefficiency that courts may consider at the
certification stage might include impediments to short selling, violations of put-call parity, and
serial correlation of prices. See, e.g., In re Polymedica Corp. Secs. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260,
273–79 (D. Mass. 2006).
78. The SEC has taken steps to reduce the compliance costs of disclosure for highlycapitalized and well-known seasoned firms on the assumption that their securities trade in an
efficient market. See, e.g., Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities
Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,534, 73,536 (Dec. 27, 2007) (reaffirming that the
“system of integrated disclosure has, since its inception, been premised on the idea that a company’s
disclosure in its registration statement can be streamlined to the extent that the market has already
taken that information into account”); see also Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient
Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 136–44 (1984)
(describing the relationship between integrated disclosure and shelf registration).
79. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 340.
80. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 942–44 (2013) (discussing the divergence of “the interests
of directors and executives . . . from those of shareholders,” the “expressive significance for
shareholders beyond the direct financial effects,” and justifications for disclosure of political
spending); Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 115,
125 (2013) (arguing that securities disclosure can promote international regulatory convergence
around social and, particularly, human rights); David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting
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At the federal level, advocates of socially responsible corporate
decision-making have pressed for the use of federal securities disclosure to
establish norms of conduct in areas such as bribery, environmental
responsibility, executive compensation, campaign finance, conflict
minerals, and consumer protection.81 As Professor Cynthia Williams has
argued, public disclosures under federal securities law not only aim to
improve the accuracy of financial information but also to “provide
additional information bearing on how profits are being generated.”82
Compelling “disclosure of considerable information about policies,
choices, and processes” may establish an “information-forcing-substance
regime” that ultimately forces substantive engagement with such issues.83
Disclosure is not the only tool that advocates of corporate social
responsibility have sought to employ. Congress, the SEC, and the listing
exchanges have considered or adopted shareholder voting requirements on
specific corporate governance matters, such as equity compensation plans
and “say-on-pay” votes on executive compensation,84 in addition to greater
disclosure about compensation practices.85 These advocates have also
attempted to reform the process and reduce the cost of nominating
institutional shareholder representatives to corporate boards to encourage
proxy contests based on corporate policy.86 Shareholder initiative rules
as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 440
(2005) (arguing that “environmental performance information” is a “public good” that companies
will underproduce and understandardize without mandatory disclosure).
81. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012) (requiring disclosures relating to conflict minerals
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo); id. § 78m(q) (requiring disclosure of
payments by resource extraction issuers); Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953(b)(1), 124
Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l note) (requiring disclosure of the
ratio of the median annual total compensation of all employees of the issuer and the annual total
compensation of the CEO); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 80, at 928 (advocating SEC rule
making following Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
82. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1999).
83. Sale, supra note 1, at 143.
84. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–21 (2014).
85. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2014); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 312.00.
86. Institutional investors have made such efforts both through lobbying for mandatory rules
and through private ordering. Dodd–Frank authorized the SEC to “issue rules permitting the use by
a shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of securities for the purpose of
nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer.” Dodd–Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code). The SEC adopted such a requirement shortly thereafter. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (adopting Rule 14a-11). Nevertheless,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11 as “arbitrary and capricious”
due to the SEC’s failure “adequately to assess the economic effects of the new rule.” Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Not coincidentally, Delaware
contemporaneously amended its general corporation law to permit the adoption of bylaws that

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 22

668

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

likewise give both institutional and retail activists a tool for lobbying for or
against particular business practices.87
II. MANAGING TRANSITIONS TO PUBLICNESS
U.S. federal securities law does not hold out a unitary concept of
publicness, nor does it necessarily mandate a single path to becoming
public. Some firms resist becoming publicly held or traded as long as they
are able to secure private financing and restrict ownership or resale of their
securities. Other companies contemplate a public offering on a specific
timetable with a view toward providing exit opportunities for founders and
investors, but they may elect not to pursue an exchange listing to avoid the
higher levels of visibility, transparency, and accountability that such
commitment entails. Yet others may oscillate between higher and lower
states of transparency as the costs of public exposure wax and wane in
relation to the benefits of access to capital markets.
Regardless of how companies make the transition, each aspect of
publicness discussed in Part I transforms the relationship between a
company and its investors, capital markets, and society—often abruptly
and at substantial short-term cost to the issuer. This Part considers three of
the critical transitions that regulation and market norms must address on
the road to higher orders of publicness: (1) the shift from control to
liquidity; (2) the shift from negotiated to standardized disclosure; and (3)
the gradual internalization of negative externalities. As the number of
holders of, or the volume of transactions in, a class of equity securities
increases, those equity holders simultaneously lose control and gain
liquidity. Standardized disclosures and external research come to replace
negotiated access to information and individualized due diligence. As the
issuer’s social footprint grows, policy makers look to the issuer to
minimize the spillover effects of its financial reporting, corporate
governance, and business operations.
A. The Exit Gap: From Control to Liquidity
The most critical transition a company undergoes is the shift in leverage
between managers and investors as public investors increasingly hold and
provide comparable access to proxy materials. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009); see also Fisch,
supra note 5, at 769 (commenting on continuing efforts to obtain shareholder proxy access through
“private ordering” under Delaware law); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its
Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 36 (2012)
(characterizing Delaware’s decision to amend its corporation law to allow shareholders access to the
company’s proxy solicitation materials as “giv[ing] enough of what the relevant federal players
want so that . . . the federal authorities will refrain from seeking more and will instead turn their
attention elsewhere”).
87. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014).
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trade the company’s shares. Sophisticated creditors and investors may wish
to share control (or at least have the option to assert control) over a nascent
enterprise and its founders in light of significant uncertainty as to how to
maximize value at the outset of a relationship.88 Consequently, the
managers of an enterprise that seeks to raise more than trivial amounts of
capital must decide how much autonomy they are willing to cede to attract
sophisticated investors.89 As a company’s equity base grows, the dilemma
abates: the availability of liquidity reduces the need for sophisticated
investors to participate in control because they have an exit option.90
Shepherding this transition raises two questions of regulatory policy.
First, to what extent should regulators deliberately restrict (or refuse to
expand) the exit options of sophisticated investors? On the one hand,
constraining exit options means that fewer ventures will get off the
ground.91 On the other hand, if venture capitalists (VCs) and institutions
play a vital quality assurance role in vetting pre-public companies,92
constraining their entry and exit options might induce them to be more
selective in making investment decisions and negotiating for a greater role
in governance when they elect to invest.93 This, in turn, might help ensure
that firms that go public through this route are better managed and better
suited to public trading.
Second, to what extent should federal securities law protect
unsophisticated investors from opportunistic behavior as the offering
options for issuers increase and the exit options for sophisticated investors
expand? Participants in the secondary private market have traditionally

88. Shared control may take a number of forms, including staged financing, seats on the
board, the right to remove the founders from management, and covenants against certain
opportunistic behavior. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 90–92; see also William W. Bratton, Venture
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 893–94
(2002) (discussing investors’ relative preference for shared and absolute control in the face of
uncertainty and noncontractability).
89. Crowdfunded or other microcap offerings may not require such trade-offs, to the extent
that investors in such offerings may not be inclined to impose such discipline on issuers. See supra
note 29.
90. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 172 (discussing the long-standing trade-off between
liquidity and accountability for both entrepreneurs and institutional investors).
91. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that “the success of venture capital depends on
the ability of venture capitalists . . . to exit their investments”).
92. See Black & Gilson, Banks Versus Stock Markets, supra note 16, at 272–74 (discussing
the superiority of the IPO as the exit strategy for venture capital in the United States and the
corresponding influence that this strategy has had on the incentives and governance of VC firms).
93. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 30–32 (describing such concerns but downplaying the
extent to which a secondary market for VC firms would eliminate incentives for disciplined
investment).
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avoided retail markets for a variety of reasons.94 As a result, such resales
have not caused regulators to demand heightened information production
and sales practice requirements comparable to the initial public offering.95
As policy makers liberalize secondary market trading as an alternative
pathway to publicness, however, regulators must consider whether to take
additional steps to protect unsophisticated investors.96
1. Facilitating Resales
The first of these two questions—regarding exit options for
sophisticated investors—has generated significant commentary in recent
years. Within the U.S. capital markets system, the IPO remains a vital exit
route for VCs and entrepreneurs.97 From the perspective of a company’s
founders, an IPO is likely to yield the greatest autonomy; from the
perspective of the VCs, an IPO may often yield the highest return in light
of the limited number of potential purchasers with whom to negotiate a
private sale.98 Nevertheless, a VC may negotiate additional exit options
94. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 22–25. In addition to triggering the
Exchange Act’s numerosity threshold, public secondary trading could subject the issuer and its
owners to double taxation. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 43 (discussing the impact of classification
as a ‘“publicly traded partnership[]”’ under the Internal Revenue Code).
95. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 40, at 491 (“[W]hen your sellers get ready to resell
their shares, because you’re under 2,000 and because you haven’t registered on a stock exchange
and listed on a stock exchange and you haven’t done IPO, the resale occurs without any periodic
10-K, 10-Q disclosure for the resale market.”); cf. Pollman, supra note 6, at 205–06 (noting the
debate between regulators over how much restraint is necessary to control secondary markets).
96. See Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1624–27 (discussing the role
of sales practice regulation as a substitute for the Securities Act regime).
97. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan:
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 883
(1997); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 356 n.136
(2005).
98. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active
Stock Market?, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36, 42 (1999) [hereinafter Black & Gilson, Active Stock
Market] (describing the potential exit through an IPO as part of an “implicit contract” over control
between VCs and entrepreneurs to encourage high performance). Commentators generally perceive
other options, such as trade sales or put rights, as inferior. See, e.g., Pierre Giot & Armin
Schwienbacher, IPOs, Trade Sales and Liquidations: Modelling Venture Capital Exits Using
Survival Analysis 1–2 (unpublished manuscript) (Mar. 14, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=461840. Trade sales create potential for
opportunistic behavior insofar as senior investors may have an incentive to cash out earlier and at a
lower valuation, whereas junior shareholders and founders have an incentive to hold out for higher
valuations. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 994–97 (2006). But see Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 28–29
(suggesting that incentives might be inverted in some cases as entrepreneurs seek an early exit while
VCs hold out to maximize return). Fiduciary remedies, voting rights, appraisal rights, and other
legal rights may or may not be sufficient to constrain such behavior. See Fried & Ganor, supra, at
999–1008.
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with respect to the businesses in which it invests—such as the right to sell
its stake to another VC, to compel a sale of the business or its assets to a
third party, or to liquidate the firm and exercise contractual priority with
respect to the distribution of its assets.99
Although regulators cannot create liquidity, they have some flexibility
to influence this dynamic by regulating or deregulating the resale of
securities in ways other than through a registered public offering. Some
defenders of the status quo have suggested that maintaining the IPO as the
preferred regulatory exit option is advantageous because it forces founders
and investors to operate the firm in a sufficiently disciplined manner to
induce a third party (i.e., an investment bank acting as underwriter) to
commit capital to taking the firm public.100 In their view, delinking capital
lockup (permanence of capital) from investor lockup (permanence of
investment) might reduce the incentive for VCs to monitor or assert control
over the activities of an enterprise.
However, other commentators argue that expanding exit rights for
sophisticated investors—perhaps to include less-regulated tiers of trading
for sophisticated investors or members of the public—may encourage
capital formation by reducing the risk faced by VCs in committing to
uncertain investments.101 Companies may delay an IPO to take advantage
of the higher valuations that are possible in heady market cycles or to avoid
lower valuations in underwhelming cycles;102 thus, market conditions may
lengthen the time frame between initial investment and a successful IPO,

99. See DAVID P. STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY 346–48
(2d ed. 2013). VCs organized as private funds typically have an investment horizon limited by the
life of the fund (e.g., five to ten years). As a result, such VCs must structure their investments to
arrange for exit prior to the dissolution of the fund. See id. at 346–47; TIROLE, supra note 23, at 90–
92.
100. See Black & Gilson, Active Stock Market, supra note 98, at 43–44 (implying that the
advantage of the IPO is the intermediation of a third-party investment bank willing to certify public
worthiness of a firm).
101. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 28–29 (“When VC and entrepreneur incentives are not
aligned, the direct market provides a solution.”). VCs may want to lockup founders as well.
Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 23–24 (suggesting that misalignment of incentives can
occur if founders or key employees sell a significant part of their shares and that transfer restrictions
can help prevent this problem). Commentators nevertheless express skepticism that liberalizing
resales—without a means for investors to interact with the issuer in the same way as first-round
investors—creates sophisticated secondary market liquidity. See Black & Gilson, Active Stock
Market, supra note 98, at 47–48 (explaining that companies have tried the “straightforward
approach” of bank-centered capital markets creating stock markets and failed); see also infra note
128 and accompanying text (discussing the composition of secondary private markets and their
independent access to information).
102. See generally Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and
Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002) (discussing the relevance of market timing).
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despite the contractual time line for the liquidation of a private fund.103 As
a result, the lack of alternative exit options may force VCs to avoid capitalintensive, longer-to-maturity industries to focus on late-stage ventures or
serial entrepreneurs104 or to bargain for greater control.105
2. Facilitating Purchases by Unsophisticated Investors
If liberalization of private resales is desirable to encourage capital
formation, one must ask whether the public offering process remains a
necessary filter to protect unsophisticated investors. The Securities Act’s
registration regime contemplates the broadest possible diffusion of
securities in a single transaction to create immediate availability of
institutional and retail liquidity.106 The decision to go public, as described
above, has nevertheless become as much a matter of timing as a matter of
reaching financial milestones.107 Moreover, academic commentators have
questioned the value of the underwriting spreads, the risks of short-term
underpricing and long-term overpricing, and the retail frenzy associated
with the U.S. IPO process.108
Resales among sophisticated investors, by contrast, raise fewer
regulatory problems. As long as secondary investors have either the
opportunity to negotiate for a voice in governance, the right to demand a
public offering to create instant liquidity for their securities, or the ability
to evaluate the merits of an investment in the absence of influence,
regulators should feel no obligation to step in to balance control and
liquidity. The challenge regulators have faced is determining whether there
is a risk that such securities will eventually penetrate the retail market
before a company has conducted a public offering—and if so, developing a
strategy for restricting or filtering such transactions to protect
unsophisticated investors.109
103. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 14.
104. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 9 (noting that “VC funds tend to avoid
risky investments in ‘capital intensive’ and ‘longer-to-maturity’ start-up companies” and that “VC
funds have generally become more conservative and risk-averse”).
105. See id. at 12 (“Under the traditional VC cycle, venture capitalists bargain explicitly for
convertible preferred stock with its attached control and information rights to protect their
investments against the downside risk.”).
106. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 102, at 1798 (discussing the conventional lifecycle theory
of IPOs).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 102–05; see also Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs,
supra note 7, at 909 (noting that section 5 of the Securities Act is now a lesser restraint on the IPO
selling process than it once was and that such deregulation “reflects a faith that [IPO] selling efforts
are not so troubling”).
108. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1013–16; Ritter & Welch, supra note 102, at 1802–22
(discussing explanations for short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance); Jonathan A.
Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 965, 986 (1995) (criticizing underwriter behavior).
109. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1019 (questioning whether “retail investors [would]
be harmed if we eliminated IPOs” but required issuers of public offerings to be seasoned).
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i. Restrictions on Offers and Resales to Unaccredited Investors
The SEC has traditionally justified restrictions on the offer and resale of
securities as anti-evasion rules to discourage issuers from effecting
unregistered public offerings.110 Mechanistic limitations on the resale of
securities have arguably lost some of their luster as a strategy to check the
emergence of secondary markets in privately placed securities. Time and
size restrictions—such as holding periods or limitations on the amount of
securities that can be freely resold in the wake of an unregistered
offering111—are crude tools to slow the penetration of securities into a
secondary market because they force initial purchasers to assume economic
risk for a longer period of time.112
Likewise, the prohibition against public offers in connection with
private placements—the “general solicitation” prohibition—has provided
some assurance that issuers would not condition the retail market,
including a retail resale market, for their securities.113 The cost of the
prohibition has been that it limits the flexibility of issuers to communicate
information to otherwise eligible investors.114 The JOBS Act’s elimination
of the prohibition in connection with offerings to accredited investors may
nevertheless lead to the type of mass media coverage—newspaper,
internet, and social media advertising—that ultimately draws in the retail
110. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,546–49 (Dec. 17, 2007)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239) (describing the purpose of the Rule 144 safe harbor for
resales); Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242 (Feb.
28, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
111. See 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 35, at 576–80 (describing the history of Rule 144).
112. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,548 (commenting on the
reduction of the holding period for Rule 144); Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules
144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9242 (discussing the benefits of adopting shortened holding
periods). To the extent that the Securities Act contemplates direct offerings to unaccredited
investors, there may be little justification (except as a means of prohibiting evasion of offering
rules) to prohibit the resale of such securities to other nonprofessional investors through holding
periods and size restrictions. This is particularly true if professional investors can provide liquidity
to nonprofessional investors. For example, the JOBS Act codifies a one-year holding period for
resales to persons other than accredited investors in the wake of an unregistered crowdfunded
offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e) (2012); see also Sara Hanks, JOBS Act Crowdfunding Provisions
Await Clarification by SEC, 17 ELEC. COMMERCE & L. REP. (BNA) 1741, 1745 (2012) (recognizing
the resale restrictions imposed by the JOBS Act).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014); see Elan W. Silver, Comment, Reaching the Right
Investors: Comparing Investor Solicitation in the Private-Placement Regimes of the United States
and the European Union, 89 TUL. L. REV. 719, 735 (2015) (discussing the evolution of the
prohibition against “general solicitation” in private placements).
114. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the Federalist
Society’s Panelist Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act,” 38 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 453, 454 n.3, 464–65 (2013) (citing discussion by Joanne Medero, Managing Director,
BlackRock).
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public when a resale market develops.115 If so, then the onus shifts
irreversibly to investor intake—ensuring that accredited investors are in
fact accredited—and the suitability of the offered securities for
downstream purchasers.
In theory, the SEC could tighten resales to nonaccredited investors in
high-end private placements while simultaneously liberalizing resales
among accredited investors. As Professors Thompson and Langevoort
point out, the disconnect between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
makes it difficult for the SEC to do so.116 Once the risk of Securities Act
evasion has passed or the statute of limitations on associated remedies runs
out, the Securities Act provides little authority to restrict resales on
investor-protection grounds. Conversely, the Exchange Act’s antifraud
provisions may favor increased diligence and disclosure by broker–dealers
when dealing in unregistered securities in the secondary market,117 but the
Exchange Act arguably also offers little authority to restrict resales to
specific tiers of investors.
ii. Suitability
Suitability is a complementary tool that provides additional protection
in connection with the sale of privately placed or publicly offered securities
to retail investors.118 Under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s
(FINRA) suitability rule, broker–dealers generally must exercise
“reasonable diligence” when recommending an investment transaction or
investment strategy, which includes an obligation to ascertain information
about both the investment itself and “the customer’s investment profile.”119
115. Professor Lawrence Hamermesh and Peter Tsoflias contend that “the chances of a
company’s general solicitation or advertisement reaching, let alone causing significant damages to,
non-accredited investors [are] relatively low” in light of the relative shareholdings of accredited
investors and retail investors. Id. at 472.
116. Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1575–76.
117. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (listing the information and documentation that the
SEC requires broker–dealers to possess prior to publishing, or submitting for publication, any
quotation for a security).
118. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1560–61 (1989) (suggesting that suitability rules “provide an alternative solution” to the
problem of protecting unsophisticated investors); Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings
Conducted over the Internet: Are They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CALIF. L. REV. 67,
128 (1998) (proposing a federal suitability standard as part of Regulation A and Regulation D).
119. FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 2111(a). FINRA’s suitability rule comprises three
components: “reasonable-basis suitability, customer-specific suitability, and quantitative
suitability.” Id. at supp. material .05. Under the first component, the broker must have “a reasonable
basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable for at
least some investors.” Id. Customer-specific suitability requires diligence into customers’ investment
profile, including their “age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any
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To the extent that JOBS Act reforms have shifted the focus from regulating
offerings to regulating transactions with specific offerees, some
commentators have suggested that sales practice rules, such as suitability,
may eventually supply the infrastructure for primary transactions in
unregistered offerings.120 A fortiori, they might play an equally significant
role in secondary resales in the wake of such placements.
Consider, for example, how the principles-based approach for verifying
accredited investor status mirrors the suitability rule.121 Under Rule 506(c),
an issuer has to consider a number of factors when determining the
reasonableness of its effort at verification, including: the “nature of the
purchaser”; the “type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to
be”; the “amount and type of information that the issuer has about the
purchaser”; the “nature of the offering”; and the “manner in which the
purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering.”122 Likewise, the
crowdfunding rules suggest that Congress favors a regulatory approach that
protects investors by imposing limitations on the amount invested in
relation to their means.123
Suitability-based approaches have nevertheless proven unsatisfactory
because violations of the rules or regulatory requirements of self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) are generally not actionable per se.124 Private rights
other information the customer may disclose.” Id. R. 2111(a). Quantitative suitability requires the
broker to “have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of recommended transactions, even if
suitable when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the customer when taken
together in light of the customer’s investment profile.” Id. at supp. material .05.
120. See, e.g., Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1624–27 (suggesting that
enhanced sales practice regulation might compensate for deregulation of the public offering process
under the Securities Act).
121. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
122. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule
506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,776 (July
24, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 230, 239 & 242). While private funds that routinely offer
interests in reliance on Rule 506 may build this structure internally, there is a sense that some of this
diligence could be professionalized through broker–dealer sales practice rules. See, e.g., IVANOV &
BAUGUESS, supra note 34, at 16–17 (discussing the use of finders in Regulation D offerings).
123. Cf. Regulation D Revisions, 53 Fed. Reg. 7866–71 (Mar. 10, 1988) (eliminating
“accredited investor” status for individuals who purchase at least $150,000 in securities if the
amount purchased does not exceed 20% of the person’s net worth). In some ways, capping an
individual offeree’s investment as a percentage of income or net worth improves upon Regulation
D’s net-income and net-worth tests by regulating the amount of an investment as opposed to the
mere act of investment. From the perspective of individual investors, such an approach would seem
to tailor the protections of federal securities law to the ability of individual investors to absorb risk.
124. See, e.g., GMS Grp., LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Although
arguably there is no right of action simply for a violation of NASD rules, violations may be
considered relevant for purposes of § 10(b) unsuitability claims.” (citations omitted)); Jablon v.
Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]here is no implied right of action for an
NASD rule violation.”). In the securities context, the availability of mandatory arbitration of
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of action are typically rooted either in breach of a common law duty of care
or, in the context of securities law, in breach of an implied representation
that broker–dealers will conduct themselves in accordance with industry
norms.125 Reliance on the antifraud provisions of securities law thus gives
rise to the same burdens of proof and affirmative defenses that frustrate
private litigants in the context of affirmative misstatements or misleading
omissions.126 Moreover, the requirement of due diligence in assessing a
customer’s status and objectives assumes that customers are entirely
forthcoming about their financial situation; judicial inquiry may therefore
often focus on the customer’s actual circumstances rather than the broker–
dealer’s diligence into the security being sold.
B. The Transparency Gap: From Negotiated to
Standardized Disclosure
In addition to balancing control and exit rights, federal securities law
naturally plays a key role in managing the flow of information to investors
as a company transitions to increasing levels of public trading and
monitoring. Specifically, federal securities law must bridge the gap
between a system in which investors privately negotiate access to
confidential information and a system in which investors enjoy the benefit
of an efficient informational marketplace informed by periodic and
episodic issuer disclosures and driven by external research and analysis.
Information disclosure functions relatively well at the extremes.
Controlling or anchor investors in privately held firms are able to negotiate
for board seats, access to records, periodic meetings with founders, and
other sources of information necessary for them to monitor and guide
management.127 In addition to the considerable diligence undertaken by
secondary purchasers of venture capital interests in private companies, the
networks through which VCs seek to transfer such interests may exist in a
geographically-concentrated marketplace where investors are able to meet
face to face with entrepreneurs.128
disputes under the auspices of self-regulatory bodies creates further uncertainty, for good or for ill.
See generally 2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1795–1808 (analyzing arbitration under the SEC
statutes).
125. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1271 (1995) (describing implied representations of broker–dealers that they will deal fairly with
customers).
126. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627,
677–78, 681 (1996) (explaining the concept of a customer’s right to rely and noting the judicial
imposition of a duty to read).
127. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 90.
128. Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 34–36 (providing an example of the India
Venture Board); see also Pollman, supra note 6, at 203 (“[T]he secondary markets make it easier
and more efficient for buyers and sellers to identify each other and transact.”); supra note 101 and
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At the other extreme, the discipline imposed by institutional investors
may be able to enforce adequate disclosure in highly sophisticated
secondary markets without regulatory intervention. For example, investors
in debt securities may require issuers to comply with reporting
requirements similar to those of Exchange Act reporting companies
through standard indentures or negotiated covenants.129 Moreover, some
firms may commit to maintain compliance with SEC internal reporting
controls and other quality-assurance rules even after withdrawing from
Exchange Act reporting.130 For internet companies whose valuation turns
in significant part on the availability of user metrics, public information or
otherwise easily verifiable information may suffice to make valuation
determinations.131
Federal securities law, however, has never successfully developed a set
of disclosure, compliance, and governance rules to facilitate a measured
transition between these two extremes. For firms that pursue an IPO and
simultaneously pursue an exchange listing, this transition is abrupt and
expensive;132 many private ventures therefore cannot afford to go public,
accompanying text (discussing limitations on private secondary markets). For example, markets
such as SecondMarket and SharesPost have largely functioned as venues for VCs and institutional
investors to snap up shares sold by founders or employees. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 36–37.
Professor Darian Ibrahim asserts that participants in such secondary markets are investing in latestage companies that pose a reduced risk of lemons, and participants often purchase additional
shares from the issuer directly, which permits direct bargaining for information. See id. at 17–20.
129. See, e.g., Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, 1184 (2000) (noting
that when a company making a debt offering “is not publicly-traded or ceases to be subject to the
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, many indentures add a provision which requires the
filing, with the Trustee, of the information, documents, and reports comparable to those required
[for listed securities under the Exchange Act]”). Because section 12(g) of the Exchange Act only
counts the number of holders of equity securities, private placements of debt securities cannot
trigger Exchange Act reporting unless the issuer lists securities on an exchange or they are the
subject of a public offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(A)–(C) (2012).
130. Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of
Sarbanes–Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 10 (2009) (noting that
“the rate at which formerly publicly traded companies have remained SEC reporting companies
after going private has significantly increased since SOX’s enactment,” particularly because of the
use of high-yield institutional debt).
131. Internet firms whose profitability is directly linked to the volume of hits or the size and
churn of the user base may provide investors with sufficient and verifiable information to
extrapolate values from the publicly available financial disclosures of comparable publicly traded
firms. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 347 n.39.
132. See supra note 25 and accompany text; see also Thomas G. James, Far from the
Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for
Securities Fraud in Connection with Crowdfunding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1773 (2013)
(“The costs associated with observing applicable securities regulations, in particular registration
under Section 5 of the Securities Act, would likely exceed the financing available to startups
through a public offering.”); Id. at 1773 n.47 (providing that under the registration and disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act, offerors incur “a litany of fees for underwriters, legal counsel,
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and smaller post-IPO companies struggle to comply with Exchange Act
disclosures. As a result, the tendency is to assume that regulators should
scale the costs of Exchange Act disclosures to the ability of the firm to bear
them rather than assess whether the production costs, compliance costs,
and litigation risk warranted by any disclosure scheme are reasonable in
relation to anticipated (if unquantifiable) regulatory benefits.133
While the scope of the content of disclosures is almost always a
relevant factor, the context in which companies produce the disclosures is
perhaps more important: namely, the ex ante compliance cost and ex post
litigation risk associated with periodic disclosures and other public
communications. To the extent that internal controls and other compliance
processes entail a high fixed cost of implementation, they may have a
disproportionate impact on smaller firms.134 Moreover, to the extent that
their securities do not actively trade, any accuracy-enhancing benefits of
such controls may largely be wasted.
By the same token, however, increased litigation risk may be
appropriate to discourage manipulative or deceptive behavior by managers
of issuers that are bridging the transparency gap.135 To be sure, companies
already face a heightened risk of litigation in the wake of an IPO,136
particularly in light of the higher due diligence standard imposed by the
Securities Act.137 However, a heightened diligence requirement for
electronic filings, accountants, broker–dealers, and stock exchange listings, as well as the fees owed
to the SEC and state securities regulators”).
133. See Schwartz, Law and Economics, supra note 10, at 349–50.
134. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 107, 129 (2009) (finding support for the
hypothesis that Sarbanes–Oxley disproportionately affected smaller firms).
135. For a discussion of the desirability of class action remedies in light of the net social
welfare cost of litigation that appears to reallocate wealth among shareholders holding diversified
portfolios, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556–66 (2006). Individual shareholders may
nevertheless receive a net benefit from the ability to sue statutory defendants and offering
participants other than the issuer. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s
Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1127–30 (2008) (discussing the
“circularity” critique of public and private actions against issuers and other disclosure participants);
Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 903, 913–17
(1997) (proposing an external certification regime for corporate disclosures to this end).
136. One study found that companies mounting an IPO from 1996 to 2000 faced a cumulative
risk of litigation of approximately 28% within the ten years following the offering. Securities Class
Action Filings: 2014 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 26 (2014),
https://www.cornerstone.com/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=8b34f0cd-79a2-497a-9821-a28939
28506f [hereinafter Cornerstone Study]. Exchange-listed companies faced an average 2.9% risk of
Rule 10b-5 litigation on average from 1997 to 2013. Id. at 8.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2012); see also id. § 77m (setting the statute of limitations for actions
under section 11 of the Securities Act at the earlier of one year after the discovery or three years
after the security was bona fide offered to the public).
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managers, broker–dealers, and other intermediaries may be appropriate for
firms that do not have an extensive analyst or institutional following. Not
only are the securities of such issuers uniquely exposed to the risks of retail
panic and euphoria,138 but their managers may also have an incentive to
offload shares during heady market conditions if there is no sobering
pushback from institutional interests.139
C. The Spillover Gap: Internalizing Externalities
The final transition policy makers face entails shifting the
accountability of corporate managers away from an exclusive focus on
shareholder value and toward capital markets and the public generally.140
Public monitoring and accountability entails building compliance and
disclosure mechanisms for the benefit of constituencies other than
shareholders.141 Regulatory policy must therefore manage the imposition of
such incremental costs on companies. Direct costs may include additional
production and verification requirements and associated litigation risk;
indirect costs may include loss of confidentiality and competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis private companies or smaller public companies.142
Benefits are more difficult to quantify: regulators must consider first for
whose benefit these additional obligations are created and for which subset
of companies the public benefits of compliance outweigh the private costs.
One might classify such obligations as: (i) efforts to improve the
operation of financial markets; (ii) efforts to improve the relationship of a
company with its stakeholders; and (iii) efforts to serve social or political
goals unrelated to capital allocation or corporate governance. Capitalmarkets externalities generally relate to the transparency, efficiency, and
continuity of market prices. Professor Marcel Kahan argued that inaccurate
138. See, e.g., Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 33–34.
139. See, e.g., Ritter & Welch, supra note 102, at 1799 (discussing market-timing theories of
IPO cycles).
140 Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (articulating a theory of directorial primacy based on the idea that
“boards exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of
all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees,
and possibly other groups, such as creditors”).
141. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes–Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 334, 341 (describing the
regulatory framework of Sarbanes–Oxley as one of surveillance for the protection of investors: “The
behavior of insiders is to be constantly monitored. The public corporation has become an entity
under surveillance by gatekeepers (outside directors, lawyers, and auditors) and government.”).
142. Moreover, because such rules apply to all Exchange Act reporting companies
indiscriminately, they may discourage smaller issuers from accessing public capital markets
altogether. Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report, UNIV. DENVER, 130 (Nov. 30,
2006), http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-governance/empirical-committee-capitalmarkets-regulation.pdf.
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stock prices not only harm existing investors but may also systematically
discourage investment in the stock market if investors are unwilling to
make long-term commitments or expose themselves to unnecessary market
volatility.143 Scholars routinely debate the effectiveness of the “accuracyenhancing” aspect of such internal controls over financial reporting.144
Some post-Sarbanes–Oxley studies have found little evidence that the
Act’s reforms improved the financial performance of public companies as
reflected in stock prices,145 while other studies suggest that institutional
investors sufficiently value such mechanisms to negotiate for them in
voluntary filings.146
Similarly, advocates for corporate governance reform often speak in the
name of improving accountability to shareholders,147 even though the
143. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 1006, 1019, 1025 (1992). Among other consequences, the withdrawal of investors
from capital markets may impair capital allocation, liquidity, and willingness to absorb risk, see,
e.g., id. at 1034; cause management to focus on stock price performance rather than long-term
growth, id. at 1028–29; increase the frequency of insider trading, macroeconomic shocks, and
changes in control resulting from abrupt changes in market price; and decrease the desirability of
long-term corporate contracting and capital budgeting. See generally id. (discussing the panoply of
market maladies caused by inaccurate stock prices).
144. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1047, 1093–95 (1995) (questioning the value of accuracy-enhancing aspects of mandatory
disclosure rules). To the extent that investors are most concerned about management’s expectations
as to future prospects rather than historical information, critics suggest that the additional
information conveyed by these mechanisms may yield to investors only marginal benefits that do
not justify their significant compliance costs. See, e.g., id. at 1106–07.
145. Romano, supra note 5, at 1529 (finding that the literature in the field “indicates that the
data do not support the view that the SOX initiatives will improve corporate governance or
performance”). Professor Roberta Romano has observed that many of the corporate governance
innovations introduced by Sarbanes–Oxley—such as independence requirements for boards and
audit committees, limitations on non-audit services by external auditors, and executive
certifications—have little or ambiguous empirical support. See id. at 1529–43. Additionally, several
studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of new compliance and disclosure obligations on the
efficiency and accuracy of stock prices. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES LITIGATION 16–29 (2002) (noting that a number of scholars have
“sought to ascertain how the SEC’s mandatory disclosure regime has fared compared with voluntary
practices by firms” with results indicating that the “agency has added little value”). But see FRANK
B. CROSS & ROBERT A. PRENTICE, LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE 152–89 (2007) (surveying
empirical studies suggesting that “restrictive securities law rules may also produce significant
economic benefits” and that the “pure private ordering paradigm is not optimal for securities
markets”).
146. Professor Robert Bartlett III’s study of high-yield debt markets suggests that issuers with
publicly or privately traded debt may covenant to file voluntary disclosures under the Exchange Act
relating to economic performance, even as they avoid disclosure requirements relating to qualitative
matters or corporate governance. See Bartlett, supra note 130, at 19–20.
147. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897,
901 (discussing corporate governance reforms from the perspective of shareholder primacy).
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interests of other constituencies often fuel their momentum.148 For
example, executive compensation has been a primary target of the
shareholder primacy movement.149 Measures that strengthen the link of pay
to performance, such as more detailed disclosure and “say-on-pay”
votes,150 might confer some benefit on public corporations even as they
create opportunities for vocal constituencies to use such disclosures and
voting power to achieve other ends.151 In recent years, compensation
reform efforts have drifted more aggressively to serve other goals—such as
promoting pay equity for employees and reducing systemic risk of financial
institutions—with only attenuated benefits to shareholders.152
Finally, social disclosure and corporate social responsibility reforms are
at best “only loosely coupled with orthodox (and arguably more
measurable) notions of investor protection.”153 These might include
disclosures relating to environmental impact or climate change, provenance
of materials, bribes or other illegal payments, labor practices, and similar
matters.154 In many cases, the benefits of such legislation are not
susceptible to any politically meaningful cost–benefit analysis because it is
difficult to quantify either the impact of the activities at issue or the effect
of disclosure on the extent to which firms engage in those activities.155
Moreover, while such disclosures may benefit investors in that they
foreshadow the likelihood of corporate liability, they arguably aim to serve
as the catalyst, rather than bellwether, of further governmental action.
148. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 380–81.
149. See Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 2179, 2208 (2014).
150. Both federal securities law and exchange listing rules have mandated incrementally
greater disclosures and shareholder participation regarding executive compensation. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n–1 (2012) (requiring a periodic, nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation);
NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 303A.08 (requiring that shareholders be “given the opportunity to
vote on all equity-compensation plans”).
151. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 8 (2004)
(distinguishing the authors’ “completely pragmatic and consequentialist” approach to improving
managerial accountability from “alternative critiques” of executive compensation).
152. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (requiring federal financial regulators to prescribe rules
prohibiting “any types of incentive-based payment arrangement” that “encourages inappropriate
risks by covered financial institutions”); Pay Ratio Disclosure, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,582–85
(Oct. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 & 249) (weighing the possible benefits to
shareholders as well as the public policy benefits of adopting a rule requiring each reporting
company to disclose the ratio of the median of the “annual total compensation” of all employees
excluding its chief executive officer to the annual total compensation of its chief executive officer).
153. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 340.
154. See id. at 372–73; supra note 81 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 376 (stating that
verification may be incomplete because “such costs can suck up all the benefits of division of labor”
to the corporation and, if shareholders do seek information, the “result will be to overproduce some
information at the same time that the overall amount of information may be underproduced”).
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If the goal of such obligations is to promote investment in firms with
good governance or socially responsible business practices,156 reliance on
the reporting obligations of public companies poses particular problems
because the coverage of the Exchange Act is both over- and underinclusive.157 Even if a representative sampling of large public companies
would suffice to provide the markets with adequate information about the
spillover effects of corporate activity, the SEC is not necessarily the right
agency to oversee such disclosures. Scholars have questioned whether the
SEC has the resources or expertise to develop criteria that impose
disclosures not only in proportion to the materiality of the information to
the firm’s business158 but also in proportion to the materiality of the firm’s
activities in the economic and social mosaic.159
III. REGULATING THE TRANSITION
As implied by previous discussion, two competing approaches manage
the transition from private ordering to public regulation today. Issuer156. See, e.g., David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material NonFinancial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 158–61 (2007) (noting that an expanding number
of socially responsible investors “seek information about company management commitments” and
“[c]ompared to past generations, investors today seek more and better information from companies
about a complex range of issues”). But see Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and
the “Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 71 (2005) (“As much as one might
like for investors to be more interested than they are in information about the social impact of
corporate activities, it might be misguided to implement a costly new disclosure regime on the
theory that their better selves would want the information.”).
157. Exchange Act reporting obligations are under-inclusive because private firms may engage
in equivalent conduct with no public accountability. The omissions of nonreporting companies may
not only impair the comprehensiveness of the reporting regime, but may exacerbate the competitive
gap between public and private companies. Such obligations are likely to be over-inclusive in that
the activities of smaller reporting firms may not be of a scope or scale sufficient to provide
nonobvious, nonredundant information to policy makers. For these reasons, encouraging
disclosures by all companies—regardless of their status under federal securities law—might be a
preferable approach to achieve these broader policy objectives.
158. To a degree, the SEC has standardized environmental disclosures to this end, but
consistent with its expertise and statutory mission, it has focused on the materiality of information
to investors rather than the public interest. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND
TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 44 app. II (2004).
159. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd–Frank Act for Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2011) (“The broader an agency’s jurisdiction,
the more likely it is to lack the resources or focus to address all appropriate priorities.”); Barbara
Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of
the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1117 (2012) (“The SEC has consistently, and with good
reason, asserted that it has inadequate resources to address all the increased demands placed upon it,
particularly by growth in the securities industry and by Dodd–Frank.”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/22

34

Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness

2015]

PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLICNESS

683

driven approaches allow issuers to elect higher or lower levels (or simply
different categories) of regulatory scrutiny in exchange for specific public
benefits, often from a menu prescribed by a regulator or market
intermediary. Metrics-driven approaches instead scale the benefits and
obligations associated with companies in various stages of publicness with
greater uniformity based on quantifiable or observable attributes of their
operations and activities.
The principal advantage of issuer-driven approaches is to give issuers
greater control over when and to what degree they become subject to or
able to withdraw from the public gaze. This flexibility not only permits
issuers to conduct a more finely-tuned analysis of the trade-offs created by
the applicable regulatory framework, but it also carves out a role for selfregulatory bodies and market intermediaries to perform a continuous cost–
benefit analysis of the attendant privileges and obligations for both issuers
and investors. By contrast, the advantage of metrics-based approaches is
naturally to eliminate such discretion when issuers abuse it or fail to adapt
to public expectations or to the practices of similarly situated companies.
Neither paradigm, of course, exclusively describes the current U.S.
regulatory framework. Many companies exercise significant freedom over
their public exposure today: whether to mount a public offering, whether to
list on an exchange, and whether to go private or escape abroad.160 At the
same time, policy makers have whittled away at the amount of discretion
that issuers and intermediaries enjoy to calibrate regulatory trade-offs
within the different categories of publicness—to the point that the
relevance of such decisions in public company regulation has become
increasingly “anachronistic.”161 As a result, while issuers retain choice,
they lack flexibility.
This Part explores some of the promises and pitfalls of issuer-driven
and metrics-driven approaches. Sections III.A and III.B consider the
benefits and disadvantages of the issuer-driven paradigm in U.S. federal
securities regulation, while Section III.C focuses on the difficulties posed
by more recent metrics-based approaches to tiering publicness.

160. See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes–Oxley: The Irony of
“Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 149–51 (2006) (highlighting the cost–benefit analysis that
may lead to going private transactions); id. at 152–54 (contrasting alternatives, such as the decision
to go private and the decision to list abroad).
161. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 352 n.69, 353 (discussing the
requirements of section 12(b)). See generally Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1993) [hereinafter Seligman, New Corporate Law] (discussing the displacement of
state corporate governance norms by federal regulation).
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A. The Issuer-Driven Paradigm
The issuer-driven paradigm of public company regulation rests on three
pillars. First, a statute, regulator, or self-regulatory body must divide the
marketplace for securities into discrete tiers of regulation. Often, such tiers
describe the relevant marketplace (e.g., global, national, regional, small
cap, or microcap) or industry sector (e.g., high-tech or internet). Second,
the law must identify the trade-offs issuers face at each transition, as
described in Part II, with respect to liquidity, transparency, and compliance
obligations.162 Third, there must be an intermediary—such as an
investment bank, broker–dealer, or exchange—that facilitates these
transitions to calibrate and enforce the associated privileges and
commitments on an ongoing basis.
The underwritten IPO and exchange listing are perhaps the best
developed systems of issuer-driven regulation. Scholars have long
recognized investment banks as the reputational intermediary that serves as
a gateway to public markets, even as the SEC and SROs have assumed the
role of setting baseline disclosure standards and offering practices for
public companies.163 Likewise, stock exchanges in the United States and
around the world have used tiering of listed securities as a means of scaling
the application of their corporate governance and disclosure rules to the
needs and resources of individual issuers.164 In particular, to the extent that
an exchange is able to coordinate the interfaces among tiers, the exchange
could substantially reduce the cost of transitioning from one regime to
another.165
162. See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACC. & ECON. 233, 260–61 (2005) (using
an event study to document “firm-specific costs and benefits, as well as externalities, of disclosure
regulation” for firms that are not in compliance, already in compliance, and newly in compliance
with FINRA’s recently adopted Exchange Act reporting requirement for OTC BB firms).
163. See Black & Gilson, Active Stock Market, supra note 98, at 44; Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 64, at 613–21 (discussing the role of the investment banker); see supra text
accompanying note 100.
164. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89,
145–48 (2007) (discussing incentives for issuers to list on various exchange tiers). For example,
issuers trading in an exchange’s pre-public tier might be able to mount an initial public offering and
launch public trading for retail investors with greater certainty as to pricing, liquidity, and
institutional interest. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1019–22 (analogizing such a market to the
“English Premier League”).
165. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation
of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 356–58 (2006) (discussing the
benefits of a common trading platform both across borders and across products); see also Chris
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435,
1476 (2008) (discussing the benefits of a common platform in facilitating the trading of securities
across borders).
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The use of exchange listing as a form of tiering has long played a
particularly prominent role in cross-border offerings since issuers often
view the listing rules of different national markets as stepping stones to
higher, lower, or different levels of regulation.166 Professor John Coffee
suggests that many non-U.S. firms might have historically chosen to crosslist their securities in the United States, in part, based on the “higher
likelihood of legal enforcement, the signal of profitable investment
opportunities, the more credible promise of improved disclosure,
contractual protections negotiated on entry into the U.S. market, [and] the
enhanced analyst coverage” associated therewith.167
The “passporting” privileges conferred on listed issuers in the European
Union (EU) likewise demonstrate the potential benefits of building tiered
regulatory regimes within a single jurisdictional area. Under EU directives,
issuers whose securities are listed or admitted to trading in a venue
authorized as an EU regulated market may be offered and traded
throughout the EU in reliance upon the issuer’s home country registration
and periodic disclosure requirements.168 Meanwhile, junior markets, such
166. See Brummer, supra note 165, at 1477–78 (describing stock exchanges as “sellers of
foreign law” consistent with the issuer-choice paradigm of securities regulation (emphasis
omitted)); Davidoff, supra note 164, at 145–48 (discussing incentives for issuers to list on various
exchange tiers).
167. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1830
(2002). But see Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4
CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 160–62 (2003) (citing studies that suggest that cross-listing in the United States
may allow foreign issuers to avoid more onerous corporate governance regulation in their home
country). Markets such as London’s Alternative Investment Market, the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange,
and Frankfurt’s former Neuer Markt similarly cater to smaller businesses using a lower-tiered listing
as a stepping-stone to broader capital-markets access. See Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities
Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market, 13
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 285–89 (2008); Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 25–26;
Mark Boslet, Some Venture-Backed IPOs Look to London’s AIM as NASDAQ Cools, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 23, 2005, at B.4B.
168. Article 17 of the Prospectus Directive provides that “where an offer to the public or
admission to trading on a regulated market is provided for,” a prospectus approved by the home
member state of an issuer “shall be valid for the public offer or the admission to trading in any
number of host Member States” with appropriate notification of the host member states’ competent
regulatory authorities. Directive 2003/71, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
November 2003 on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or
Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC) (amended by
Directive 2010/73, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010, 2010 O.J.
(L 327) 1 (EU)). Similarly Article 3(2) of the Transparency Directive provides that a host member
state (a state in which issuers admit securities to trading on a regulated market) may not, as regards
the admission of securities to a regulated market in its territory, impose disclosure requirements
more stringent than those in “this Directive or in Article 6 of Directive 2003/6/EC” or on
shareholders or other persons or entities. Directive 2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 December 2004 on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
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as London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM), admit issuers without
requiring compliance with EU directives.169 More recently, the EU has laid
the groundwork for multilateral trading facilities that serve the small and
medium enterprise (SME) growth market to “raise their visibility and
profile and aid the development of common regulatory standards in the
Union for those markets.”170
Several academic and industry proposals to tier levels of regulation in
the United States rely on the assumption that regulators can restrict
participation in opaque markets to sufficiently sophisticated market
participants.171 Under such approaches, private secondary markets could
assume responsibility for screening admission to trading by vetting
investors’ sophistication and capacity to absorb risk, as well as the degree
of access to information they provide.172 However, an implicit premise of
this structure is that trading venues, dealers, and other intermediaries can
create market tiers or categories that supply enough liquidity from qualified
investors to sustain trading until issuers are able to achieve different stages
of publicness. Others suggest that public investors should be able to
participate in lower-tiered markets, although firms might be timed out of
such lower tiers (much as “emerging growth companies” are phased into
Exchange Act compliance under the JOBS Act).173
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and
Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC) (amended by Directive 2013/50, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 13 (EU)).
169. See EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS LAW 78 (Rüdiger Veil ed., Rebecca Ahmling trans.,
2013).
170. Directive 2014/65, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU,
2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (EU), ¶ 132, at 369 [hereinafter MiFID 2].
171. See, e.g., Mendoza, supra note 167, at 297 (describing AIM as a “junior” market for
predominantly “senior” investors, though AIM does seek to attract retail investors through tax and
other incentives). Several scholars have floated approaches to eliminating statutory obstacles to
trading among accredited or other sophisticated investors. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Patching
a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic
Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 208–11 (2013) (suggesting restrictions on tradability of shares and
compliance with alternative disclosure regimes as conditions for a contingent exemption from
periodic disclosure requirements for firms that meet the author’s proposed size and numerosity
thresholds); Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1019–20 (restricting access to the “English Premier League”
companies to accredited investors); Sjostrom, Carving a New Path, supra note 58, at 664
(suggesting revisions to Rule 144 to promote an active resale market among sophisticated investors
so that an issuer can obtain liquidity without going public).
172. The revisions to Rule 506(c) under Regulation D expressly contemplate such delegation.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Other proposals have contemplated more aggressive selfcertification regimes in which investors would qualify themselves to participate in comparatively
less-regulated market centers. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A MarketBased Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2000).
173. Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 580–92 (describing the contours of an
“emerging-firm market”).
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B. The Difficulty of Maintaining Issuer-Driven Tiers
While multi-tiered exchange listing may hold promise as a tool of
issuer-driven regulation, it has lost much of its effectiveness in the United
States despite decades of experimentation. In some respects, lower-tiered
markets have always struggled at attracting liquidity for small to mediumsized enterprises, regardless of how much energy regulators and market
operators devote to promoting investor interest. In the United States, a
variety of additional forces are at work: some commentators cite the
federalization of corporate governance and disclosure policy as hampering
the flexibility afforded to exchanges and market centers to develop and
promote such tiers, while others focus on the laxity in enforcement of
listing standards as exchanges increasingly compete for trading volume and
listings.
1. Creeping Federalization of Standards
Scholars often cite the creeping federalization of corporate governance
and disclosure policy as a prime factor in the erosion of the self-regulatory
authority of exchanges.174 Congress initially limited application of the
Exchange Act’s periodic reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider reporting
and trading provisions to exchange-listed firms.175 Frustration with larger
firms that refused to list on exchanges led Congress to extend Exchange
Act reporting to a broader swath of over-the-counter firms in 1964.176
Similarly, as the SEC has expanded and reformed Exchange Act disclosure
requirements during the past four decades, the marginal value of voluntary
disclosures encouraged or mandated by listing rules has arguably
diminished.177
While exchanges retain some incentives and discretion to promulgate
qualitative governance rules and standards that are stricter than SEC
requirements,178 the SEC has often viewed exchange rule making and
174. See Seligman, New Corporate Law, supra note 161, at 1–3 (discussing the displacement
of state corporate governance norms by federal regulation); see also Dombalagian, Identity Crisis,
supra note 9, at 324–28.
175. Dombalagian, Identity Crisis, supra note 9, at 324 n.24.
176. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 565–68
(amending the Exchange Act to extend “disclosure requirements to the issuers of additional publicly
traded securities” by adding section 12(g) thereto); REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 7–17;
Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks,
55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 29–30 (1986).
177. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 562–68.
178. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54
SMU L. REV. 325, 329–30 (2001) [hereinafter Karmel, Future of Corporate Governance] (“Even
after the promulgation of the Exchange Act, the NYSE was still concerned with the practices of its
listed companies.”). In addition to the quantitative requirements for listing eligibility, the NYSE has
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enforcement in the area of corporate governance as a means of
americacircumventing statutory limitations on its own authority.179
Following the SEC’s failed attempt to regulate corporate governance
listing standards in the 1990s,180 advocates of corporate governance reform
understandably turned to federal legislation.181 Congress’s unprecedented
involvement in the composition and operation of corporate boards of listed
companies over the past decade,182 however justified, threatens to leave
increasingly little room for exchanges to differentiate listed firms in terms
of quality.183
At the same time, federal policy makers have made only lukewarm
efforts to recognize privileges or provide other benefits for companies that
choose to list. Some privileges have endured even as the signaling effect of
a listing has diminished. The Federal Reserve Board’s margin regulations
historically imposed qualitative obligations, such as real-time disclosure of certain material
information during volatile market conditions, and qualitative corporate governance rules respecting
the independence of auditors, directors, and audit committees. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67,
§§ 202.03, 303A.00 (2006). NYSE listing agreements also continue to provide important
protections for investors in exchange-listed securities by restricting the dilution of their voting
rights in various corporate finance transactions. Id. § 313.00(A).
179. See Karmel, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 178, at 352; Robert Todd
Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57
BUS. LAW. 1487, 1490 (2002). Prominent examples are the SEC’s efforts to require the NYSE to
enforce its rule against dual class recapitalizations after its own Exchange Act Rule 19c-4 was
vacated in Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and to require exchanges
to adopt rules governing auditor independence in the late 1990s. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein,
Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1063 (1999); see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407 (finding that the SEC exceeded its authority
to amend exchange listing standards in adopting Rule 19c-4, which prohibited exchanges from
listing stock of a corporation that takes any corporate action “with the effect of nullifying,
restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights” of existing common stockholders
because the rule “directly controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of
shareholders” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 92–94,
121–23 (2005) [hereinafter Karmel, Dream] (discussing the federalization of stock exchange rules).
182. See id. at 123 (characterizing Sarbanes–Oxley’s directive to the SEC as a “subdelegation of delegated authority, which is troubling as a federal law making
methodology”); supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (describing the audit committee
requirements of Sarbanes–Oxley and the compensation committee requirements of Dodd–Frank).
Congress has previously looked to the independence of boards and board committees when
considering the legitimacy of certain corporate actions in other contexts. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
§ 162(m)(4)(C) (2012) (permitting corporations to deduct certain incentive-based compensation
approved by an independent compensation committee).
183. See Karmel, Dream, supra note 181, at 121–23 (describing the NYSE’s decision to adopt
various listing standards relating to corporate governance in the wake of Sarbanes–Oxley).
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have historically treated listed and unlisted equity securities differently
because of the differing expectations as to the liquidity of those securities
and the efficiency of the markets in which they trade.184 Likewise, federal
and state law may still steer U.S. institutional investors toward investments
in listed securities due to historical restrictions on institutional
participation in control.185
Even when policy makers attempt to create privileges for exchangelisted companies, it may be difficult to use those privileges as organizing
principles for reinforcing a system of tiered listing. For example, Congress
sought to preempt the application of state registration requirements to toptiered, exchange-listed securities as part of the National Securities Markets
Improvements Act of 1996 (NSMIA), thereby codifying exemptions for
exchange-listed companies that largely permeated blue-sky laws at the
time.186 Because Congress later extended the same privilege to privately
placed securities under Rule 506, however, the NSMIA exemption
effectively undermines a nontrivial incentive to develop a progressive
listing regime.187
184. Generally speaking, broker–dealers may not extend credit against any “[n]onmargin,
nonexempted equity security” because there is little guarantee that a broker–dealer will be able to
liquidate the securities at a price reasonably related to market value after a customer default. 12
C.F.R. § 220.12(e) (2014); see also id. § 220.7 (setting maximum loan value of nonmargin stock
and all other collateral for extensions of credit by banks and other lenders at their “good faith” loan
value). Under Federal Reserve Board Regulations T and U, broker–dealers, banks, and non-bank
lenders may lend customers up to 50% of the market value of any margin equity security (i.e., the
customer must maintain equity, or “required margin,” of the remaining 50% of the purchase price)
and require “good faith” margin for debt securities. Id. §§ 220.12(a), 221.7(a). SRO rules permit
customers to finance securities purchases as long as they generally maintain minimum equity (or
“maintenance margin”) in both equity and debt securities. See, e.g., NYSE RULE 431.
185. See, e.g., Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 306–15 (2007) (describing
rules that restrict mutual funds and pension funds from engaging in certain types of investments).
See generally ROE, supra note 20 (providing historical evidence that banks, insurers, mutual funds,
and other institutional investors in the United States—unlike Germany, Japan, and other
jurisdictions—have been actively discouraged from exercising a controlling interest in U.S.
companies due to historical circumstance); infra note 279and accompanying text.
186. See National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
§ 18(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3417–18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2012)) (preempting state
law registration and qualification requirements for “covered securit[ies],” including securities
“listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange, or listed on the National Market System of the Nasdaq Stock Market (or any successor to
such entities)”).
187. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 151, 188–96 (2010) (criticizing the regulatory no-man’s land for privately placed securities
resulting from the extension of section 18 of the Securities Act to Rule 506 offerings). The SEC has
proposed to extend state law preemption to Regulation A+ offerings as well. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
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2. Competition Among Exchanges
Competition among exchanges and market centers is also frequently
blamed for eroding much of the freedom that exchanges traditionally
enjoyed in maintaining higher listing standards. Primary exchanges—such
as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the former American Stock Exchange
(AMEX)188—have long competed for listing and trading revenues.189
While these exchanges have remained successful at preserving the prestige
of a primary listing, regional exchanges and alternative trading systems
have succeeded in diverting substantial trading volume away from the
trading facilities of the listing exchanges.190 Meanwhile, foreign exchanges
have gained ground on the NYSE and NASDAQ in attracting primary
listings.191
To be fair, one may attribute much of the increase in competition to the
SEC’s efforts to deregulate exchange rules. Over the past several decades,
the SEC has labored to eliminate many of the anticompetitive privileges
once enjoyed by exchanges regarding listing and trading: not only has the
SEC made it easier to trade securities off of an exchange, but it has
pressured the exchanges to make it easier for issuers to delist as well.192
Other elements of regulatory policy conversely squeeze the profitability of
trading to the point that the liquidity commitments of listing exchanges
may become increasingly desirable. For example, some commentators have
188. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (recognizing the listing standards of the NYSE,
AMEX, and the top tier of NASDAQ as the standard for preemption of state registration
requirements). AMEX is now known as NYSE MKT. News Release, NYSE, NYSE Amex LLC to
Be Renamed NYSE MKT LLC (May 10, 2012), available at http://www1.nyse.com/press/
1336646911531.html.
189. See, e.g., Lang et al., supra note 179, at 1491 (“[B]oth the American Stock Exchange
LLC (Amex) and Nasdaq have adopted less stringent corporate governance listing standards to
compete with the NYSE for listings.”). Historically, exchanges derived their profits from three
principal sources: listing fees, trading and market data fees, and membership fees. See Regulation of
Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613,
70,624–25 (Dec. 17, 1999).
190. See Maureen O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality?,
100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 465–67 (2011) (analyzing the increase in market fragmentation as a result of
the primary exchanges—the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX—losing market share to alternative
trading venues).
191. See Aaron Lucchetti, U.S. Falls Behind in Stock Listings, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2011,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703421204576329400112880300
(paid subscription required) (illustrating the 43% decline in the number of U.S. listings from 1991–
2011 and the concomitant rise of listings on foreign exchanges); see also Cornerstone Study, supra
note 136, at 9 (noting the uptick in U.S. listings and IPO activity following the passage of the JOBS
Act).
192. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling SelfRegulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1122–33 (2005)
[hereinafter Dombalagian, Demythologizing].
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criticized the push to decimalization and the enhanced scrutiny of marketmaker spreads under the Volcker Rule for reducing liquidity in the unlisted
over-the-counter market.193
Whatever the cause, primary exchanges have a strong incentive to keep
their listing standards sufficiently flexible to attract and retain issuers,
whether for good or for ill.194 Commentators have noted the tendency of
exchanges to waive corporate governance rules for foreign issuers who are
not subject to comparable rules in their home country or to delay
involuntary delisting proceedings for larger companies that fail to meet
qualitative listing requirements.195 Skeptics argue that Congress and the
SEC should strip exchange listing of its remaining significance in federal
securities law rather than use the listing process as a focal point for
coordinating federal and SRO policy.196
While this argument has some appeal, there are significant legal and
historical differences between exchange listing and other certification
mechanisms. First, the SEC must approve material changes to listing
standards. Even in the muddy waters of a principles-based system of selfregulation, exchanges cannot unilaterally water down their listing standards
without the SEC’s assent.197 Shifting certain aspects of public company
regulation out of the SEC and onto self-regulatory bodies, moreover,
insulates them from political scrutiny without a loss of SEC oversight.198 In
193. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(6) (requiring the SEC to “examine the impact that
decimalization has had on the number of initial public offerings since its implementation” as well as
“on liquidity for small and middle capitalization company securities and whether there is sufficient
economic incentive to support trading operations in these securities in penny increments”); Order
Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a Tick Size
Pilot Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 72460, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,840 (June 30, 2014) (ordering U.S.
stock exchanges and FINRA to develop and implement a pilot program to widen quoting
increments for certain small capitalization stocks); see also Prohibitions and Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5579 & n.553 (Jan. 31, 2014) (discussing commentators’
concerns that a narrow exemption for market making under the Volcker Rule would reduce marketmaker interest in the securities of small and midsized issuers and companies).
194. See, e.g., Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135,
221 & n. 413 (1998) (praising the flexibility of exchange listing standards relative to SEC rule
making); NYSE Euronext, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23 (Feb. 26, 2013) (discussing the
competitive pressures of exchange listing).
195. Lang et al., supra note 179, at 1514–15.
196. See, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing
Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1462 (1992) (suggesting that
exchange corporate governance standards are “marketing campaigns” that provide little substantive
protection for shareholders).
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C)(i); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2014).
198. Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988
DUKE L.J. 286, 291. But see Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 22

692

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

addition, exchanges cannot require their market makers to commit capital
to firms that fail to draw sufficient trading interest or whose shares trade in
such a sufficiently thin market that they run the risk of manipulation.199
***
As with other regulatory functions formerly performed by national
securities exchanges, listing may over time evolve into a self-funding
regulatory function in the United States segregated financially and
operationally from the trading operations of registered exchanges.200 For
example, as stock exchanges began to demutualize into for-profit
companies, the member regulation arms of the NYSE and the National
Association of Securities Dealers merged to establish FINRA as the single
self-regulatory body for the securities industry.201 While listing privileges
in the United States are largely a duopoly enjoyed by the NYSE and
NASDAQ (with other registered exchanges sharing in a sliver of the
market share),202 the proliferation of trading venues might counsel in favor
of spinning off listing activity to a similarly constituted self-regulatory
authority in the future.203
C. The Alternative of Metrics-Based Approaches
Legislative and regulatory attempts to exclude or minimize issuer
choice in regulation default to quantitative criteria. To be effective, such
metrics must generally be both quantifiable and verifiable: the longstanding “financial milestones” employed in tiering registration and
Survey, 80 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1253–56 (2007) (noting the criticism that regulatory oversight
may be insufficient to counter the effects of political insulation).
199. See Jonathan Macey et al., Down and out in the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of
the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683, 709–10 (2008) (suggesting that “[a]n optimal listing
policy [hypothetically] should provide optimal liquidity for a stock consistent with the exchange’s
interest of making, or at least not losing, money while protecting both current and future investors
in the company”).
200. See, e.g., Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 198, at 1294 (noting the trend to segregate the
regulatory functions of exchanges and other SROs from activities in jurisdictions that rely on
“cooperation” between SROs and administrative agencies that oversee them).
201. HAZEN, supra note 31, § 14.3[3], at 119–21 (describing the creation of FINRA).
202. See generally Daniel M. Gray, The Essential Role of Regulation in Promoting Equity
Market Competition, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 395, 398–99 (2006) (noting market
participants’ concerns regarding the duopoly between the NYSE and NASDAQ).
203. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 712 (providing an example of Canada’s Market
Regulatory Service as an independent regulatory body responsible for upholding Universal Market
Integrity Rules in Canadian markets and delisting noncompliant firms). FINRA performs a similar
function in the United States with respect to the enforcement of business conduct rules by
agreement with virtually all major U.S. securities exchanges. See HAZEN, supra note 31, § 14.3[3],
at 119–21.
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periodic disclosure obligations have historically included size as well as
numerosity, age, or seasoning.204 Moreover, a system of metrics-based
regulation should ensure a reasonable scaling of regulatory obligations to
individual tiers and provide an efficient mechanism for issuers to migrate
from one tier to another and back.
1. Identifying Criteria and Metrics
The most difficult task in quantifying an issuer’s progression down the
pathway to publicness is to identify relevant criteria and apply appropriate
metrics to monitor and enforce the issuer’s progress. Policy makers often
justify imposing higher disclosure or governance standards on larger
issuers because larger issuers engage in more regulated conduct, generate
more significant positive and negative spillover effects, or are simply better
able to afford the necessary controls.205 The numerosity of shareholders
captures the intuition that legal requirements should vary based on the
number of individuals who benefit and the difficulty of promoting
collective action.206 Age and seasoning are also factors that have become
increasingly important, though scholars offer different theories as to why
the relative age of a firm should justify more or less regulation.207
However relevant these milestones may be, the metrics used to measure
them may be archaic, outmoded, or susceptible to abuse. Issuers may game
their capital structure to avoid triggering metrics for monitoring
numerosity, as discussed above, by reducing the fungibility of securities or
aggressively exploiting the gap between record and beneficial
ownership.208 Creating new metrics, nevertheless, requires consideration of
204. See Schwartz, Law and Economics, supra note 10, at 349–50 (discussing the academic
attention that the issue of scaling disclosure requirements by measures of size and seasoning has
drawn). Professors Langevoort and Thompson have proposed extending such metrics to calibrate
the application of social disclosures as well. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra
note 1, at 379–80 (recommending a $700 million threshold consisting of “the top 20% to 30% of all
registered companies” for the application of enhanced public disclosure requirements).
205. See, e.g., Schwartz, Law and Economics, supra note 10, at 367–69, 381–83, 387–89
(citing these and other commentators’ arguments in favor of higher disclosure standards for larger
issuers). One might measure size in a variety of ways, either by market capitalization for companies
that have a public trading price or various measures of accounting assets (total assets or net worth)
as calculated under generally accepted accounting principles. See id. at 368 & n.119.
206. In recommending legislation to Congress, the SEC considered, among other alternatives,
whether transfers of stock, concentrations of holdings, or trading interest in interdealer markets
might serve as alternative measures of public interest. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 18 (1963).
The number of shareholders was ultimately adopted, “perhaps not surprisingly, as the single most
workable and most meaningful criterion” to trigger periodic disclosure requirements for unlisted
securities. Id.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 215–217.
208. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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the attendant compliance costs. Volume-based metrics, for example, may
complement or supplement size and numerosity requirements without
introducing significant additional operational costs209 to the extent that
systems are already in place for collecting relevant trading data.210 Other
metrics, particularly those better linked with social disclosures, might be
more challenging. For example, it may be more appropriate to target social
disclosures through measures of economic footprint such as sales volume,
earnings, market share, size of payroll, number of employees, and other
factors.211 However, building systems for standardizing such data might be
excessively costly in light of the benefits.212
2. Monotonicity of Regulation
A second concern with metrics-based approaches is the delicacy with
which policy makers can scale the scope of regulation to metrics. A
recurrent theme of regulatory reform proposals is that issuers should enjoy
reduced disclosure and substantive obligations in successively lower tiers
209. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 341 (supporting volumebased thresholds). But see Guttentag, supra note 171, at 199–200 (suggesting that not enough
empirical evidence exists to select volume-based thresholds for regulating disclosure). For example,
the SEC has endorsed using U.S. trading volume for purposes of determining whether to require
foreign issuers to register under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) & note 1 (2014)
(exempting foreign private issuers from Exchange Act registration and reporting obligations under
section 12(g) of the Exchange Act if, inter alia, “at least 55 percent of the trading in the subject
class of securities on a worldwide basis took place in, on or through the facilities” of securities
markets in the foreign jurisdiction where it is listed).
210. Quotation and transaction information about exchange-listed securities in the United
States is collected through national market system plans overseen by the SEC. FINRA’s OTC
Bulletin Board Service collects transaction information about shares in certain Exchange Act
reporting companies, while its OTC Reporting Facility collects information with respect to all other
equity securities traded otherwise than on an exchange in the United States. FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 50, R. 6520–30, 6610. Various vendors provide electronic interdealer quotation systems for
unlisted equity securities as well. See OTC MARKETS, http://www.otcmarkets.com (last visited Mar.
14, 2015); OTC Bulletin Board, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/otcbb/otc-bulletin-boardotcbb (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Macey et al., supra note 199, at 698–709 (observing that some
delisted firms may enjoy substantial trading volume in such unlisted markets, including the former
Pink Sheets market, and in some cases are superior to that of listed exchanges to the extent that
unlisted markets are not subject to restrictions on tick size or affirmative market making
obligations).
211. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a)–(b) (West 2014) (purporting to regulate aspects of
corporate governance based on certain predominating contacts with the forum state such as property
holdings, payroll, sales, and other factors).
212. See, e.g., Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 70443, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 9452, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,569–73 (Oct. 1, 2013) (discussing the complexities of
calculation and alternative methodologies in light of the fact that many companies simply do not
keep track of the information necessary to perform the “total compensation” calculations required
by the Exchange Act).
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of trading, both to reduce the cost of regulation for smaller firms and
because of the regulatory restrictions or natural limitations on the number,
type, and sophistication of investors eligible to participate in them.213
Advocates of tiered market structures thus typically begin with the
assumption that policy makers will set a baseline for paradigmatically
public companies and selectively whittle away disclosure requirements,
governance standards, compliance burdens, and other regulatory elements
to craft “less regulated” tiers.214
The implicit assumption of monotonicity in regulation is questionable
for a variety of reasons. One may view some aspects of regulation as
complementary rather than supplementary. For example, regulators need
not decrease compliance costs and litigation risk for smaller issuers in
tandem; instead, they may choose to treat them as alternatives for investor
protection. In other cases, the implications of a metric (such as age) may
not be clear.215 One could argue, depending on one’s perspective, that
seasoned companies should enjoy reduced compliance costs on the theory
that they will have developed a following of outside analysts after a
number of years,216 or conversely, that unseasoned companies should enjoy
reduced compliance costs to encourage them to go public sooner.217
The administrative process makes such fine-tuning difficult. If one
assumes that a regulatory or self-regulatory authority should have some
discretion to tinker with regulatory burdens as market conditions change, it
is far easier to deregulate than to impose additional regulation. Defenders
of the SEC note that the SEC has extensive experience with granting both
general and individualized relief tailored to specific securities marketing or

213. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 6 (2012) (noting that the JOBS Act “provides
temporary regulatory relief to small companies, which encourages them to go public, yet ensures
their eventual compliance with regulatory requirements as they grow larger”).
214. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 352–53.
215. See, e.g., id. at 383–84 (expressing doubts about “on ramp” by time rather than size).
216. The SEC uses size and seasoning as a metric for relieving firms of the burden of
producing duplicative information under Form S-3. See, e.g., Revisions to the Eligibility
Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, Exchange Act Release No.
8878, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,534, 73,536 (Dec. 27, 2007) (noting that “[p]ublic float has for many years
been used as an approximate measure of a stock’s market following and, consequently, the degree
of efficiency with which the market absorbs information and reflects it in the price of a security”).
217. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 8 (intimating that the difficulty of reversing
the process of going public stalls the IPO decision); see also infra note 230 (discussing strategies
for companies going private). Reversibility may be particularly important given the unpredictability
of market conditions in the years following an IPO. For example, the five-year survival rate for
companies after their IPO stood at 52% for IPOs during the period from 1996 to 2000, 66.7% from
2001 to 2008, and 89.8% from 2009 to 2013. Cornerstone Study, supra note 136, at 25.
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distribution strategies.218 However, as courts more rigorously challenge
agency discretion and cost-benefit determinations,219 it is increasingly
difficult for agencies to add new obligations without encountering the
prospect of significant litigation.220
3. Lack of Flexibility
Finally, metrics-based approaches hamper the flexibility of issuers to
calibrate the preferred degree of publicness in line with business
conditions. As private equity firms have made it easier for firms to “go
private,”221 managers of public companies may find it beneficial to
oscillate between privateness and publicness during the life of a business.
For example, managers of a firm may find it desirable to temporarily
escape the public gaze to implement a long-term vision or take aggressive
measures at the expense of short-term profits.222
A transition from higher to lower levels of regulatory disclosure might
nevertheless trap public investors in an informational black hole.223 Absent
218. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 552, 580 (2001) (suggesting that the SEC’s current
approach is “highly tailored” and offers a great deal of private choice).
219. Cf. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting
the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1835 (2012)
(“In a contemporary legal and political climate that is defined by a rising skepticism of government
and more particularly of regulation, the SEC (and for that matter all independent regulatory
agencies) must accept that it cannot support its rule making only through generalized, undeveloped
assertions of a proposed rule’s impact on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.” (footnote
omitted)).
220. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (involving a
challenge to Exchange Act Rule 14a-11); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (reviewing a rule created by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940); see
also Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J.
ON REG. 289, 290 (2013) (discussing these developments).
221. See Bartlett, supra note 130, at 11–12; Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going Private”
on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 76 (2008) (noting that these
private equity firms “buy up companies and take them out of the public markets, allowing them to
be shielded from public scrutiny”). In “going private” transactions, either the issuer or an outside
bidder must effectively repurchase sufficient publicly traded equity securities through a cash-out
merger, reverse stock split, or reverse tender offer to fall below the section 12(g) threshold for
Exchange Act reporting. See supra note 54.
222. Shareholder wealth maximization—combined with the pressures of providing quarterly
reports, earnings guidance, and other soft information—arguably might force managers of some
public companies to behave myopically. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 221, at 80–81. But see
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW.
977, 978–81 (2013) (challenging the “short-termist argument”).
223. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 710 (asserting that the delisting of an issuer may
protect prospective investors at the expense of existing shareholders insofar as delisting may
adversely “affect[] the liquidity of . . . the informational environment surrounding” their
investment).
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a forced sale of shares, any remaining shareholders in a company that
decides to go private must sell their securities at prices set in an illiquid or
inefficient market or seek other relief.224 Some commentators have
suggested that, as long as there is sufficient purchasing interest among
sophisticated investors, retail investors would not suffer significant harm if
a public market suddenly went private.225 Others, however, view the risks
of inefficient pricing, manipulation, and incomplete reporting as too great
to permit issuers to withdraw from public trading without buying out retail
investors.226
As a result, the ease with which firms can elect to transition back and
forth among various tiers of publicness is an important consideration in the
design of any regulatory scheme. Professor Robert Bartlett’s study of the
reporting practices of firms that have gone private suggests the appeal of a
regulatory regime that offers issuers some flexibility in downgrading their
level of publicness while continuing to supply information to key
stakeholder constituencies on par with the Exchange Act.227 Similarly,
David Pompilio and Professors Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara
suggest that the delisting of larger companies should turn on a balancing of
the economic interests of issuers, investors, and exchanges.228
While issuer-driven decisions to switch status may be prone to abuse,
metrics-based regulation can force issuers to pursue unwieldy strategies to
recalibrate their degree of publicness. Prior to the 1964 Securities Act
Amendments, an issuer could in theory (with the consent of its
shareholders) simply delist to avoid Exchange Act reporting rules.229
224. Cf. Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals,
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 883–84 (2010) (discussing the availability of appraisal rights for delisting in
various EU member states).
225. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1023–24.
226. See Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 564–76.
227. See Bartlett, supra note 130, at 43–44 (discussing the result of the exercise of registration
rights, a private equity exit, or other transaction). According to Professor Bartlett, smaller firms
were more likely to resort to “SOX-free forms of financing,” such as leveraged loans, to escape
Exchange Act disclosure permanently. Id.
228. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 710.
229. Most U.S. exchanges historically discouraged delistings by requiring audit committee
approval or a supermajority vote of the shareholders, ostensibly to protect shareholders against a
loss of liquidity resulting from delisting; critics nevertheless contended that such measures
represented efforts by primary exchanges such as the NYSE to prevent competition for listings. See,
e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Repealing Exchange Rule 500
and Amending Section 806 of the Listed Company Manual, Exchange Act Release No. 48720, 68
Fed. Reg. 62,645, 62,646 (Nov. 5, 2003) (approving the repeal of former NYSE Rule 500); SelfRegulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Relating to Voluntary Delistings by Listed Companies,
Exchange Act Release No. 41634, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,633 (July 27, 1999) (approving elimination of
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Today, firms must buy out their public shareholders in “going private”
transactions230 or otherwise engineer a reduction below the Exchange Act’s
300-shareholder floor231 to avoid compliance with the Exchange Act’s
reporting and monitoring requirements. Because such transactions often
require a significant financial commitment from outside equity as well as
concomitant returns, they run the risk that management will collude with
bidders to maipulate the company’s share price.232
IV. PRINCIPLED TIERS OF PUBLIC COMPANY REGULATION
An issuer’s decision to become more or less public should ideally
integrate its interests with objective determinations: there is little point in
subjecting an issuer and its management to heightened levels of public
scrutiny if the issuer is neither willing nor able to withstand the public
gaze. A hierarchy of principles structured in the form of increasing
regulatory privileges and obligations might create the appropriate
incentives for issuers to progress through stages of publicness as they reach
critical milestones, while preserving some room for negotiation with
regulators and intermediaries at or near inflection points between tiers of
regulation.
Consider, for example, how regulatory concepts such as suitability,
efficiency, and perhaps representativeness, already inform the
understanding of what it means to be public. Suitability ties the offer of
securities to the adequacy of information available to brokers and the
financial circumstances of the investor.233 At the lower end of the spectrum
the Rule 500 shareholder vote); see also Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 192, at 1128–
29. Today, an issuer may delist from the NYSE upon approval of the issuer’s board and compliance
with the requirements of SEC Rule 12d2-2(c). See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 806.02.
230. See supra note 221.
231. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4) (2012). Issuers have engaged in questionable practices to achieve
this objective. See supra note 54. Professor Jesse M. Fried has proposed requiring a shareholder
vote, similar to the delisting requirement under former NYSE Rule 500 to effect a transaction that
would result in a firm “going dark.” See Fried, supra note 54, at 157–60.
232. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 55–59 (2008) (discussing regulatory constraints on private equity transactions).
233. See Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 123 (1993) (“[T]he suitability
doctrine has been interpreted to require the broker–dealer to undertake an affirmative investigation
into her client’s background so as to ascertain the information necessary to formulate appropriate
recommendations.”); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities
Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999) (“The suitability doctrine, always somewhat
nebulous and amorphous with respect to its content and parameters, may be broadly defined as a
duty on the part of the broker to recommend to a customer only those securities which are suitable
to the investment objectives and peculiar needs of that particular customer. The suitability doctrine
entails the matching of two elements: (i) the investment objectives, peculiar needs, and other
investments of the particular customer with (ii) the characteristics of the security which is being
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of publicness, it may be appropriate to view suitability as a filter through
which to regulate the diffusion of securities.234 Similarly, efficiency ties the
perceived integrity of market prices to the accuracy and continuity of
mechanisms for collecting and disseminating inside and outside
information. An even more rarified principle of representativeness might
link the macroeconomic significance of a particular issuer to the issuer’s
power to shape business practices in a given industry.
Accordingly, one might classify the regulatory privileges and
obligations of issuers at various stages of publicness based on the extent to
which issuers, their securities, and the markets in which they trade resonate
with these principles. For example:
•

•

•

Suitability may serve as a principle for restricting the diffusion of
securities until an issuer is prepared to generate adequate public
disclosure about and attract adequate public diligence into its
securities.
Efficiency may serve as a principle for coordinating regulatory
privileges and obligations designed to elicit soft information and
improve price accuracy, such as enhanced controls, governance, and
protocols for the dissemination of real-time, material information.
Representativeness may serve as a principle for fostering better
corporate governance and greater social responsibility among firms
that seek recognition as macroeconomic benchmarks.

The goal of such principles-based tiers would be to calibrate both
privileges and obligations in light of the ability and needs of the issuer and
its investors. Commentators generally focus on the costs of increased
publicness—heightened disclosure, monitoring, and accountability—and
whether and when these costs should apply to particular issuers; less
frequently discussed is the propriety of conferring regulatory privileges
among such firms. While the primary benefit of publicness is access to
deeper capital, calibrating privileges to obligations can both sharpen the
incentives for becoming and staying public and reinforce a tiered system of
public company regulation by better balancing costs and benefits.235
A. Tier 1: An Unsuitable Private Resale Market
As discussed above, a private resale market limited to accredited or
sophisticated investors might best serve the needs of investors in emerging
companies that are not yet ready to assume the risk and cost of ceding
recommended.”(footnote omitted)).
234. See supra Subection II.A.2.ii.
235. Apart from modifications to the Exchange Act’s reporting threshold, a self-regulatory
body—preferably, a FINRA-like listing body unaffiliated with any trading market—could largely
implement this Article’s proposal through rules without replacing or conflicting with the Securities
Act. See supra note 203.
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control and information to the marketplace.236 Given the lack of access and
information attendant to such issuers, one approach to restricting the resale
market is to consider their securities presumptively unsuitable for purchase
by unaccredited investors.237 Unaccredited investors would be able to
purchase such shares on an unsolicited basis (whether in a direct offering
or otherwise), but broker–dealers would bear the burden of proving
suitability for any recommendations they make or any sales or resales they
solicit. Courts or regulators might enforce such a presumption primarily
through arbitration or litigation on the basis of the Rule 10b-5 implied
cause of action.238
A market tier based on a presumption of unsuitability would allow
unlimited transactions among accredited investors without the risk of more
than minimal leakage to retail investors.239 The presumption of
unsuitability could be overcome in two ways: (1) if a broker–dealer takes
“reasonable steps” to verify the accredited status of the investor;240 or (2) if
a broker–dealer can prove that it has undertaken independent diligence to
obtain and provide sufficient information about the issuer and the security,
in light of the investor’s ability to evaluate the merits and risks of the
investment, such that the investor can make an informed investment
decision.241 This might allow for the possibility of “friends-and-family”
resales or self-directed participation by certain sophisticated investors in
resale markets.242
The advantage of a suitability principle is that it would allow the SEC
to shift some of the more nettlesome elements of private placement
regulation to SRO administration over time. The variety of factors that one
could take into account in accrediting investors is institutionally better
suited to an SRO such as FINRA (subject to SEC oversight and
236. See supra note 171.
237. This presumption would thus place the burden of proof on the broker–dealer to
demonstrate compliance with its “reasonable diligence” obligation under the suitability rule (similar
to the Rule 506(c) verification requirement) rather than on enforcement officials or the investor in a
private right of action. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
239. In effect, this Article’s proposal creates a private resale market similar to the structure that
Professors A.C. Pritchard, William Sjostrom, Michael Guttentag, and other commentators envision.
See supra note 171.
240. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
241. FINRA’s suitability rule for resales of OTC equity securities imposes additional diligence
requirements on broker–dealers to “review[] the current financial statements of the issuer, current
material business information about the issuer, and [make] a determination that such information,
and any other information available, provides a reasonable basis under the circumstances for
making the recommendation.” FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 2114.
242. Cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (citing the sophistication requirement of SEC Rule
506(b)).
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approval).243 Moreover, to the extent that SEC rules restricting resales are
necessarily interwoven with an analysis of the role of the issuer or
intermediary in a “distribution,” an SRO-directed approach is more
consistent with the authority of self-regulatory bodies to regulate secondary
market operations under the Exchange Act.244
A second advantage is to gradually introduce issuers to the discipline of
a regulated marketplace by conditioning the development of a secondary
resale market on the provision of information to regulated intermediaries.
Some commentators advocating recognition of private secondary markets
assume that market operators will perform some vetting process with
respect to both the issuer and its trading customers.245 While an issuerbased system of verification may be reliable and cost effective for the
initial placement of interests, it may be more troubling to permit the free
243. A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office study on the definition of “accredited
investor” surveyed a variety of alternative criteria relating to the investor’s understanding of
financial risk to the relatively mechanistic criteria under Regulation D. 2013 AI Report, supra note
32, at 20–28. While most of the survey’s respondents felt that net worth was the best criterion for
determining who is an accredited investor, a principal concern the study raised was that increasing
the net worth and net income thresholds—through a periodic inflation adjustment—could
unnecessarily shrink the pool of investors eligible to participate in Regulation D offerings. Id. at 12;
see also Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 3422–25 (discussing the under- and over-inclusiveness of the
accredited investor definition). Among the alternative standards related to an understanding of
financial risk, commentators suggested that the definition should include the use of a registered
investment adviser, a license and certification standard, an education standard, an examination
requirement, or some sort of self-certification. 2013 AI Report, supra note 32, at 24–28. The
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive similarly permits a more searching inquiry into the
sophistication of an investor that opts to be classified as a “professional client.” MiFID 2, supra
note 170, annex II, §§ I–II, at 484.
The administration of such rules is arguably better suited to the iterative supervision of a selfregulatory body like FINRA rather than the brute application of statutory thresholds or SEC rules.
FINRA’s suitability rule requires a broker–dealer to have “a reasonable basis to believe that the
institutional customer is capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and
with regard to particular transactions and investment strategies involving a security or securities” to
fulfill its suitability obligation to an institutional customer without further diligence into the security
or the customer’s investment profile. FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 2111(b).
244. It is arguable that the current practice of regulating secondary market trading in restricted
securities under section 4(a)(1) rather than SRO suitability rules allows for the possibility of issuer
liability to downstream purchasers of securities sold in unregistered, nonexempt transactions. See
supra note 35 (discussing the background of section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act). To the extent
that investors often have little recourse against issuers in failed offerings, such liability might not be
as relevant as intermediary liability.
245. Cf. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE L.
REV. 1143, 1161–64 (2013) [hereinafter Sjostrom, Rebalancing] (proposing tailored civil liability
for intermediaries in private placement transactions patterned after section 11 of the Securities Act).
More saliently, private secondary market operators may come to appreciate that such vetting is
necessary to create liquidity in the absence of direct relationships between prospective investors and
issuers. See supra note 101 (discussing limitations on liquidity in private secondary markets).
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resale of securities in a secondary market without some diligence or
information-gathering obligation.246
B. Tier 2: A Suitably Liquid Market for Publicly Traded Securities
The second tier comprises those securities that exhibit sufficient
secondary market liquidity to warrant removing the presumption against
suitability without imposing the full weight of Exchange Act reporting.
While structuring such a tier is challenging, this Article envisions that Tier
2 would resemble a slow-motion IPO that provides issuers some breathing
room to build secondary market liquidity and the disclosure and corporate
governance mechanisms necessary to transition to a full-blown public
secondary market.247 Professors Jeff Schwartz and Adam Pritchard
similarly envision an intermediary phase between private resales and an
efficient public market for “emerging firms,” much as London’s AIM and
the JOBS Act impose lower compliance obligations for smaller or
“emerging growth” companies.248
The requirements of such a tier must therefore reflect a balancing of
liquidity, disclosure, and verification. For example, part of the traditional
appeal of an IPO is the commitment of the underwriter to stimulate
secondary market demand for investors in an offering.249 To the extent that
building liquidity is a prerequisite to allowing broader retail investment,
such issuers would need some liquidity commitment from an exchange,
investment bank, or market makers to enter Tier 2. Alternatively, such
issuers would need other evidence of sufficient trading interest to provide a
reasonable expectation of liquidity for investors. Unlike a traditional IPO,
the promotional efforts of the investment bank may evolve during the
issuer’s time in Tier 2,250 rather than around a carefully timed filing and
effective date.251
246. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11–15c2-12 (codifying provisions for OTC securities and
municipal securities). The adequacy of those efforts may be of great reputational interest in the case
of systems that cater to accredited investors and may be the subject of public enforcement,
litigation, or arbitration in the case of broker–dealers that place securities with nonaccredited
investors.
247. There is nothing to prevent an issuer from mounting a traditional IPO and moving into a
higher tier more quickly. But this tier would give the issuer the option to assemble the components
of the IPO more gradually.
248. See Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 580–90; Pritchard, supra note 1, at
1018–23. Professor Pritchard envisions that allowing companies to develop a reporting history and
price discovery before permitting widespread retail investment in an at-the-market offering may
obviate the negative features of IPOs. See id.
249. See Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, supra note 7, at 911–12; see also Chen & Ritter,
supra note 25, at 1116–19 (discussing the importance of commitment to ongoing analyst coverage
in the pricing of IPOs).
250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
251. See generally Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, supra note 7, at 895–909 (discussing the
“devolution” of the Securities Act’s restraints on IPOs and marketing since 1933).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/22

54

Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness

2015]

PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLICNESS

703

Eliminating the presumption against suitability, moreover, requires the
availability of some public information vetted through collective external
diligence. Listing markets may borrow specific disclosure requirements
from any number of sources.252 As Professor Jose Miguel Mendoza
suggests, the threshold for minimum disclosure is not as critical as the
freedom to provide enough information to attract trading interest by
institutional and accredited investors and thereby to have access to the
deeper liquidity provided by the addition of retail investors in subsequent
tiers.253 Such informal, unstructured information would eventually
converge on the formal requirements of Exchange Act reporting in order to
access such higher tiers.254
Because reliance on the accuracy of market prices is impossible in an
inefficient market, market intermediaries (rather than self-certification of
financial or disclosure controls by an issuer’s management) should assume
primary responsibility for regulating the quality of such disclosures. A
number of commentators have suggested civil liability schemes that would
require issuers to engage investment banks or other intermediaries to
conduct disclosure audits and face civil liability for false or misleading
statements.255 In light of the reduced disclosure requirements for this tier, a
heightened due diligence standard may be appropriate to hold the issuer or
its sponsor accountable.256
The more difficult challenge is in developing a system of external
diligence that balances costs and benefits. Stretching the due diligence
requirements of the Securities Act over a multi-year period might pose
undue risk to investment banks and intermediaries.257 Nevertheless, such
252. Among other candidates for the minimum disclosure obligations discussed throughout
this Article are those required by Rule 144A, those required by the quotation and suitability
requirements applicable to broker–dealers with respect to OTC securities under Rule 15c2-11 and
FINRA Rule 2114, those contained in standard disclosure covenants in public indentures, or those
proposed for Tier 2 offerings under the SEC’s proposed revisions to Regulation A. See supra notes
27, 57, 129, and 241 and accompanying text.
253. See Mendoza, supra note 167, at 296–97 (describing the customized compliance provided
by AIM).
254. Cf. Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, supra note 7, at 918–22 (discussing the informationfiltering role of the informal preliminary prospectus in traditional IPOs under the Securities Act as
compared to the retrospective “final prospectus” required by the Act).
255. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 135, at 913–17 (proposing an external certification regime for
corporate disclosures); Mendoza, supra note 167, at 316–19 (describing the role of Nominated
Advisers, or “Nomads,” in preserving the integrity of AIM and shepherding AIM issuers).
256. See, e.g., Sjostrom, Rebalancing, supra note 245, at 1162–66 (proposing a civil liability
scheme for issuers, officers, directors, and placement agents in private placements with a “due
diligence defense” similar to section 11 of the Securities Act).
257. With respect to shelf-registered offerings, underwriters assume ongoing due diligence
obligations with respect to an issuer’s periodic reporting as issuers take securities “off the shelf,”
although the scope of section 11 liability in such cases is limited to direct purchasers. See Joseph K.
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diligence risk may become more manageable if regulators limit diligence to
annual reports and if issuers and sponsors benefit from good-faith safe
harbors.258 The risk may be blunted, moreover, by enforcing diligence
requirements primarily through administrative sanctions259 or requiring
arbitration of claims.260 Requiring one or more exchanges, investment
banks, or market makers to publicly quote a security in this tier also
introduces the issuer and its securities into the public price reporting
mechanisms, which triggers a range of SRO surveillance mechanisms.261
An issuer that drops out of this tier—either because it ceases minimum
disclosure reporting or because it loses market-maker coverage—would
transition back to the first tier. As a result, the transition from Tier 1 to Tier
2 could not be taken lightly: firms must either jumpstart secondary market
trading through a traditional IPO or generate enough institutional interest
to persuade an exchange or market makers to enter this tier.262 The reverse
is true as well: firms and their intermediaries seeking to return to Tier 1
would have to anticipate the implications of withdrawing liquidity from
unaccredited investors, particularly if such action might subject an issuer to
Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Underwriters’ Continuous Due Diligence
After Worldcom, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2001, 2005–07, 2014–16, 2027 (2009).
258. This Article envisions that such disclosures would be entitled to the protection covering
forward-looking statements in Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2014), but not the more definitive
safe harbor for Exchange Act reporting companies today. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2012).
259. For example, issuers that fail to meet their disclosure requirements may face delisting or
lose their eligibility to advance to more liquid tiers, while sponsors that fail to meet their diligence
obligations may face disqualification from sponsoring similar issuers. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)
(enumerating events that disqualify a “bad actor” from placing securities under Rule 506).
260. Professor Barbara Black has argued that the use of corporate charters and bylaws to
require arbitration of securities law disputes are illegal under at least state law, if not federal law.
Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 802, 851. Nevertheless, recent Delaware cases have suggested an acceptance of forumselection bylaws. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938
(Del. Ch. 2013). The SEC and listing exchanges might deem such provisions inconsistent with the
requirements for companies trading in Tier 3. To the extent that there is no expectation of public
reliance on market prices under the Basic doctrine, courts will not likely recognize the availability
of class actions in any event. See supra text accompanying note 76 (explaining the Basic doctrine).
261. While this Article’s proposal recognizes the link between OTC market making and
involuntary reporting, neither the issuer nor the market maker can act alone. See supra text
accompanying note 42. Under the proposal, issuers cannot be eligible for public trading and thus
escape suitability constraints without a market maker to sponsor trading, and market makers may
not quote prices in securities without the availability of minimum disclosures.
262. For well-connected firms, the flexibility to choose between tiers may be desirable.
Venture capital and private equity firms, for example, might appreciate the freedom to negotiate an
underwritten offering or a commitment to market making depending on the nature of the security
and the degree of retail and institutional interest. For firms that do not qualify for the VC fast track,
market makers and SROs that operate both private secondary markets and public over-the-counter
markets would be free to devote resources toward helping issuers phase across platforms without
incurring the expense and risk of an IPO.
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liability for breach of fair dealing under state law or subject intermediaries
to liability if they breach representations as to liquidity.
C. Tier 3: An Efficient Market for Pricing Securities
The third tier encompasses firms that trade in a sufficiently efficient
market to warrant application of higher compliance obligations. To qualify
for this tier, an exchange would have to determine that the issuer’s
securities meet the exchange’s criteria for price efficiency.263 Such firms
would thereafter undertake to comply with disclosure rules designed to
ensure broad, continuous dissemination of information. These rules might
include enhanced financial and disclosure reporting controls, audit
committee requirements, selective disclosure prohibitions, and real-time
disclosure requirements. Policy makers might also require such firms to
comply with corporate governance requirements designed to improve
reporting accuracy and accountability to shareholders.264
The function of this tier is essentially to reinvigorate the role of a
traditional exchange listing in screening firms for liquidity and price
efficiency. Since the Basic decision, courts have, for good or for ill,
usurped this role from the exchanges.265 The Basic test essentially
supersedes the function of exchanges in identifying firms whose securities
trade in a relatively efficient market based on largely quantitative and
empirical factors.266 Rather than relying on a judicial determination of
efficiency in the context of an adversarial process (particularly one
disfavored by courts), a regulatory or self-regulatory authority (such as a
stock exchange’s listing board) ought to make determinations of efficiency
in accordance with an administrative process that weighs the costs and
benefits of recognizing the market for a firm’s securities as relatively
efficient.
To the extent that federal securities law favors seasoned Exchange Act
reporting companies in a variety of regulatory contexts,267 only Tier 3 and
Tier 4 companies would have access to these regulatory benefits under this
Article’s proposal. For example, there may be less need to regulate follow263. This proposal would not prohibit exchanges from listing securities in lower tiers. Instead,
as discussed above, this Article envisions that exchanges would establish national market tiers that
correspond to the gradations of publicness this Part of the Article outlines.
264. Enhancing proxy solicitation rules, proxy expenditure rules, institutional nomination
procedures, compensation oversight, and other corporate governance initiatives may only make
sense in markets with a sufficient institutional participation to ensure their judicious use. To the
extent that Congress has restricted the application of many of its enhanced corporate governance
requirements to listed companies, the reservation of such requirements to Tier 3 is consistent with
Congress’s current policy.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
266. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 78.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

57

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 22

706

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

on offerings or affiliate resales in a market where professional trading
interest, rather than managerial speculation, arguably sets prices.268
Extensions of credit against securities collateral are likewise reasonable if
publicly reported prices bear a fair relationship to the liquidation value of a
security.269 Antifraud laws may further limit liability for forward-looking
statements and other soft information to the extent that professional traders
are able to filter them critically.270
Meanwhile, the option to delist to Tier 2 instead of Tier 1 may mitigate
the negative impact of voluntary and involuntary delisting from Tier 3.
While some firms may prefer to avoid public markets altogether, the option
to reduce the cost of disclosures and controls while retaining retail
investors in Tier 2 may appeal to some firms, particularly those required to
delist for failure to meet qualitative listing standards.271 A negotiated
transition from Tier 3 to Tier 2, with the prospect of relisting, may blunt
the immediate outflow of institutional investors from delisted companies
as well.272
D. Tier 4: A Market for Representative Issuers
The final tier might entice large firms that are representative of their
industries’ business practices to provide greater social disclosures as a
condition of representation in nationally-recognized indices and the
heightened liquidity available to the component securities of such
indices.273 Listed firms would opt into this tier by undertaking to comply
with enhanced disclosures about their business operations and the impact
they have on stakeholders other than shareholders. In return, policy makers
would, as they do in some respects today, recognize national and sector
indices comprised of such securities as suitable underlying instruments for
listed index products.274

268. See supra text accompanying note 35.
269. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2012) (stating the safe harbor requirements for forward-looking
statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); see also supra text accompanying
notes 64–66.
271. Professor Macey and his co-authors observe that a significant percentage of regulatory
delistings are due to the failure to meet quantitative criteria only loosely related to the reduced
profitability of exchange trading. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 692. They suggest that
regulators should mandate delisting of otherwise solvent companies only in the case of “fraud or
illegal activity,” while relaxing quantitative benchmarks if there is sufficient volume to sustain
liquidity or an increase in listing fees to subsidize the provision of liquidity. Id. at 711–12.
272. See, e.g., id. at 698 (observing the high institutional trading volume that immediately
follows delisting as institutional investors rebalance portfolios to offload such securities).
273. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 375 (proposing “a distinct
class of systemically significant public issuers” upon whom “[p]ublicly reactive regulation (and
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One of the goals index providers strive to achieve in composing an
index is to “clearly convey the economic realities of the underlying interest
it seeks to measure to its users.”275 Investors in broad-based indices, such
as the S&P 500, seek exposure to systematic macroeconomic risks while
canceling out industry- or firm-specific risks through diversification.276
Investors in sector indices similarly seek exposure to a sector of the
market, including the political, social, and economic factors affecting
specific industries.277 To the extent that the content of social policy
disclosures relates to the business prospects of a firm, it is probably due to
the systematic risk of legislation, regulation, or public pressure affecting all
firms within an economic region or sector.278 Disclosures by a handful of
representative issuers might therefore suffice to establish a baseline
understanding of how relevant industries operate.
Meanwhile, inclusion in an index gives issuers privileged access to a
broader pool of passive investors. Index-linked funds have increasingly
become investments of choice for individual retirement plans, mutual
funds, and other forms of passive investment.279 Trading activity in futures
and options markets similarly fosters liquidity in the component securities
underlying an index.280 Regulators may also consider increasing net capital
most of the inchoate social agenda) would presumably be concentrated,” in order to leave “small
and mid-cap companies . . . free of the unintended burdens of publicness”).
274. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(35)(B)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(C)(i)(III)(aa) (linking exclusion from
the definition of “narrow-based security index” to the reporting status of an issuer under section 12
of the Exchange Act).
275. BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS: CONSULTATION REPORT 10
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD399.pdf.
276. Shareholders that hold a diversified, leveraged portfolio may be largely indifferent to the
risk-return ratio of individual portfolio companies. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 210 (7th ed. 2003) (asserting that “investors who
can . . . borrow and lend at the risk-free rate of interest should choose the best common stock
portfolio regardless of their attitudes to risk” under the capital asset pricing model).
277. See Patrick J. Collins, Prudence, 124 BANKING L.J. 29, 61 (2007) (discussing the benefits
of sector diversification); William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded
Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 95
(2008) (discussing the dangers of index products targeted at highly specialized or narrow sectors).
278. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 372–74 (discussing the
permeation of socio-political externalities in disclosure regulation).
279. See HARRIS, supra note 42, at 488 (describing the appeal of index funds to passive
investors); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 279, 301 (2000) (proposing to “limit unsophisticated investors to investments in only passive
index mutual funds”).
280. See HARRIS, supra note 42, at 489 (noting that program trading in index components
accounts for a substantial percentage of trading on the NYSE). There is a significant literature
debating whether inclusion in an index leads to a permanent increase in the market value of selected
firms. See, e.g., Maria Kasch & Asani Sarkar, Is There an S&P 500 Index Effect? 1 (Mar. 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2171235 (finding that,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

59

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 22

708

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

haircuts, reducing margin requirements, and generally tying other
regulatory privileges to the enhanced liquidity enjoyed by such
securities.281
Although the Exchange Act does not directly regulate indices today,
both U.S. and international regulatory developments are bringing index
composition and calculation under increasing regulatory scrutiny,
particularly with respect to the integrity of component securities.282
Moreover, to the extent that most retail trading in derivatives products
takes place on an exchange,283 exchanges can easily impose disclosure
requirements on component securities as a condition for listing broadbased and sector-based index products.284 Large firms might of course
forgo inclusion in an index if they believe the costs of enhanced disclosure
exceed the reputational and commercial benefits. Even so, general
principles of materiality may compel such firms to disclose deviations in
their business practices from those of representative issuers.285

contrary to the consensus in the literature, index inclusion has no permanent effect on value and
comovement after accounting for the extraordinary preinclusion performance of component
securities).
281. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognizes common equity
shares included in a major stock index to be Level 2B “high-quality liquid assets” for purposes of
calculating the liquidity coverage ratio for financial institutions. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY
RISK MONITORING TOOLS ¶ 54(c) (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf.
282. See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and Financial Contracts, art. 19,
COM/2013/0641 Final (proposing to restrict the ability of certain supervised entities to use
benchmarks that are not subject to EU or equivalent regulation); BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS: FINAL REPORT 20–22 (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf (proposing a framework for
regulating standard benchmarks); Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law,
Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 42–51 (2013) (discussing these
developments).
283. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (prohibiting trading in futures otherwise than by or
through a designated contract market); HARRIS, supra note 42, at 50–58 (surveying trading markets
for retail index options, futures, and other derivatives).
284. For example, for an issuer’s securities to be eligible for inclusion in an index, an
exchange might require the issuer not only to agree to provide the exchange with all material
information relevant to the individual firm and the market in which it competes, but also to provide
additional information to Congress and the SEC via legislation or rule making relating specifically
to their business practices.
285. Some firms may benefit from actual changes in regulatory policy that affect their
competitors (and therefore have an incentive to disclose how their business practices deviate from
the norm). Others may be disadvantaged by anticipated changes in regulatory policy (and therefore
may face the risk of litigation if their disclosure practices fail materially to describe how changes in
regulatory policy may affect their business).
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CONCLUSION
The privileges and obligations of public companies must evolve with
the needs of markets. Regulators play a critical role in standardizing those
privileges and obligations, but issuers, investors, and market intermediaries
must ultimately make informed trade-offs based on evolving market
conditions. A principles-based system of public company regulation may
empower issuers and regulated intermediaries to make such calculations
within an intuitive framework that is resilient in the face of shifting
political winds and market cycles.
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